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**MAOISM AND ITS POLICY
OF SPLITTING THE NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENT**



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In this book, the author lays bare the Maoists' adventuristic views on the national liberation movement and their distortion—much to the imperialists' pleasure—of the world revolutionary process. Citing a wealth of facts, he shows the grave damage the Mao Tse-tung group is causing the liberation struggle waged by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Е. Богущ

МАОИЗМ И ПОЛИТИКА РАСКОЛА
В НАЦИОНАЛЬНО-ОСВОБОДИТЕЛЬНОМ ДВИЖЕНИИ

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CONTENTS

<i>Chapter I.</i>	THE SPLITTING NATURE OF THE MAOISTS' THEORIES CONCERNING THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT	5
	Claims to Hegemony in the World Revolution- ary Movement	5
	The Role of the National Liberation Move- ment in the World Revolutionary Process	17
	Policy of "Self-Reliance"	24
	National Liberation Movement and Peaceful Coexistence	41
	Attempts to Impose Chinese Methods on National Liberation Movements	50
<i>Chapter II.</i>	MAOISTS' SPLITTING ACTIVITIES IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVE- MENT	59
	The Sino-Indian Conflict and Its Consequences Splitting Activity in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement	59
	The "Proletarian Cultural Revolution"	98
	"Heavenly Music for U.S. Imperialism"	109

Chapter I

THE SPLITTING NATURE OF THE MAOISTS' THEORIES CONCERNING THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Claims to Hegemony in the World Revolutionary Movement

It would be useless to seek in the history of the national liberation and world revolutionary movements a single instance of the division of the revolutionary, anti-imperialist forces promoting the success of their cause. Just as vain would it be to seek any affirmation of the "usefulness" of such division in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. True, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have of late managed to "find" in the Marxist-Leninist classics thoughts which allegedly testify to the "usefulness" and "inevitability" of splits among the revolutionary forces. Such "finds", however, are nothing but an attempt to distort the history of the world revolutionary process in order to justify the present splitting activities of Mao Tse-tung and his group.

The activities of Marx, Engels and Lenin were all impregnated with the concern for the unity and strength of the revolutionary forces, although there were situations in which a split was inevitable.

In the First International there were Marxist workers, Blanquists, Proudhonists, Bakuninists, trade unionists, and so on. Proceeding from their own experience of working with this mass of workers of

extremely different political views and sentiments, Marx and Engels arrived at the conclusion that it was essential to exert every effort to unite on a definite common basis the various working-class detachments, both on a national and international scale.

Marx's and Engels's traditions were taken up by Lenin. He tirelessly stood by the great principle of working-class solidarity when he led the Bolshevik delegation to the Stuttgart and Copenhagen congresses of the Second International. The resolutions against war danger adopted at these congresses stressed that the unity and solidarity of the international working class and all working people could alone help avert the world slaughter that was in the offing.

Like all true internationalists, Lenin felt very bad about the collapse of the Second International. False optimism and claims that the worse the better were something he refused to understand. Lenin vigorously criticised those who had undermined the international solidarity of the workers by their chauvinistic and splitting activities and objectively made it easier for the imperialists to unleash the First World War.

The Communist International established by Lenin in 1919 invariably guided itself by the immortal slogan "Workers of all countries, unite!" which was soon altered to read: "Workers of all countries and oppressed peoples, unite!" Waging a relentless struggle against the Right opportunist and centrist Social-Democratic leaders, Lenin at the same time took steps to prevent the further division of the international working-class movement. Under his guidance, the first congresses of the Communist International worked out tactics for the united working-class front in the capitalist countries as well as tactics for the united anti-imperialist front in the colonies, semi-colonies and dependencies. It was

upon these tactics, further developed in the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in 1935, that the Communist Parties based their activities after the dissolution of the Communist International in 1943.

Since then the international communist movement has had no single organisational centre to guide it. In 1956-57 the Communist Parties agreed to call periodical meetings to work out and improve the general policies of the world revolutionary process. Such meetings have been held three times—in 1957, 1960 and 1969—and adopted important documents defining the communist movement's general line at the present stage. Each Communist Party works out its political line for the struggle in its own country on the basis of the decisions of these meetings.

The independence of each Communist Party of course does not mean self-isolation or renunciation of joint action. The working class is international by its very nature and its solidarity exists irrespective of whether or not there is an international executive. In his letter to Austrian Communists in 1920 Lenin stressed the exceptional significance of international proletarian discipline. "We are proud," he wrote, "that we settle the great problems of the workers' struggle for their emancipation by submitting to the international discipline of the revolutionary proletariat, with due account of the experience of the workers in different countries, reckoning with their knowledge and their will, and thus giving effect in deed (and not in word, as the Renners, Fritz Adlers and Otto Bauers do) to the unity of the workers' class struggle for communism throughout the world."¹

International proletarian discipline is a permanently operating factor. It plays an especially important role in the world communist movement

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 269.

today, when the splitting activities of the Mao Tse-tung group have become highly dangerous. The practice of signing a document drawn up collectively by the Communist Parties and then denigrating it on the very next day naturally has nothing in common with proletarian solidarity and discipline. And this is exactly what the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have done with the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement.

Mao Tse-tung and his group did not suddenly break with the principles of proletarian solidarity or betray their splitting and hegemonic aspirations. These accumulated gradually, over a lengthy period of time, as a result of the influence of the socio-economic environment and traditions which objectively existed and still exist in China. China was and is a predominantly peasant country. All the aspects of its life are enormously influenced by the extremely powerful petty-bourgeois elements and nationalist ideology. Judging by everything, the traditions of feudal society, where the idea was cultivated that China was destined to play the leading role in the world, live to this day.

For centuries the feudal rulers of China regarded their country as the hub of the universe, as the Middle or Celestial Empire. The other states were all considered either tributaries or vassals of the Chinese emperors. This was responsible for the monstrous diplomatic ceremony in the process of which foreign envoys had to kowtow, that is, to kneel before the emperor and knock the forehead on the ground nine times and prostrate themselves. The emperors exerted vast efforts to isolate the Chinese people from the rest of the world. This was greatly facilitated by Confucianism, a religious and political teaching which was for centuries the official ideology of feudal China.

Could all this have anything in common with the Chinese Communist Party? Life showed it could.

In 1939 Mao Tse-tung declared at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: "We must make a summing-up from Confucius down to Sun Yat-sen and inherit this precious legacy. This will help much in directing the great movement of today."¹ Such an urge was naturally justified but the thing was the position from which Mao Tse-tung proposed to assimilate the historical heritage of his country. Characteristically enough, in that same speech he said Marxism must be put into practice only after it is "given a national form". Mao Tse-tung urged that "the foreign 'eight-legged essay' must be banned".² This was a demand for the Sinicisation of Marxism.

Mao Tse-tung was even more explicit in his well-known book *On New Democracy* (1940). The general truths of Marxism, he wrote, should be "given a definite national form", just as Chinese culture should be national in form and newly-democratic in content.³ In his speech at the meeting of the leading Party functionaries in Yen-an on February 8, 1942, Mao Tse-tung again assailed those who cultivated "the foreign 'eight-legged essay'" in the Chinese Communist Party.⁴ And this time too he had in mind the Chinese Communists who studied and worked in the Communist International educational establishments and organisations in Moscow and who, on their return home, sought to abide strictly by the decisions of the Communist International.

The Executive Committee of the Communist International naturally could not always correctly

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, London, 1954, p. 260.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., Vol. III, p. 154.

⁴ See Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, London, 1954, p. 62.

appraise the situation in China and other countries. But it was the collective executive of the international communist movement and, according to the Rules, its decisions were binding upon all Communist Parties. Mao Tse-tung, however, capitalised on the difficulties the Communist International encountered in its activity and made use of some of the mistakes of the Executive Committee to push through the idea that he and the other leaders of the Chinese Communist Party were alone capable of properly understanding the situation in China and the rest of Asia.

It is noteworthy that both then and later Mao Tse-tung repeatedly purged those who disagreed with him by staging the so-called campaigns for the "rectification of the style in work". He charged his opponents and particularly those who cultivated "foreign stereotypes" with indulging in petty-bourgeois revolutionism. In that same speech on February 8, 1942, he said: "As China is a country with a very large petty bourgeoisie, our Party is surrounded by this enormous class, and it is natural that a very great number of our members of this class origin join the Party without shedding their petty-bourgeois tails, long or short."¹ He did not have himself in mind of course.

However, the whole process of creating the so-called Asian form, or the Sinicisation of Marxism, was the fruit of national exclusiveness and other petty-bourgeois prejudices to whose influence Mao Tse-tung too fell victim. Such prejudices are known to be especially strong and tenacious, as Lenin pointed out, in the most backward peasant countries dominated by "small-scale farm production, the patriarchal system and provincialism".²

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 49.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, 5th Russ. ed., p. 168.

It might be recalled that the Party Rules adopted by the Seventh Congress in 1945 said the Chinese Communist Party guided itself in its activities by Marxism-Leninism and the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung". And in 1947 Liu Shao-chi said in a letter to American journalist Anna Louise Strong: "Mao Tse-tung's great accomplishment has been to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form. . . . Marx and Lenin were Europeans; they wrote in European languages about European histories and problems, seldom discussing Asia or China. . . . Mao Tse-tung is Chinese . . . he has created a Chinese or Asiatic form of Marxism."¹

Many years later the author of this letter fell victim to the very same "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" which he himself had so zealously eulogised.

One naturally cannot agree with the allegation that the founders of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary teaching "seldom discussed Asia". Marx's and Engels's articles about India and China, their peoples' liberation struggle against colonial and feudal oppression, the Near and Middle East problems, the "eternal Eastern question", etc., are well known all over the world.

Incidentally, it was Marx and Engels who wrote works that were model specimens of research into the revolutionary processes in the 19th-century China from the positions of proletarian internationalism and historicism. They carefully followed the development of the Taiping Rebellion.² In the "First International Review", written early in 1850, the founders of scientific communism stressed the very important fact that China then was on the verge of a social upheaval which could exert a big influence on the development of the civilised world.

¹ *Amerasia*, No. 6, 1947, p. 161.

² The revolutionary peasant war in China against feudal rule and national oppression (1851-64).

"When our European reactionaries," Marx and Engels wrote, "will in their flight to Asia in the near future finally get to the Chinese Wall, to the gates that lead to the arch-reactionary and arch-conservative stronghold, it is quite possible that they will read there the inscription:

*'République Chinoise
Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité'.*"¹

Marx's and Engels's articles about the Taiping movement, which assumed the character of a peasant war, are full of sympathy for the insurgents. But the Taipings failed to do away with feudal relations and the alien yoke. What is more, there also appeared a feudal top-crust in the Taiping state. The leaders of the peasant war degenerated into new emperors. These processes did not go by unnoticed by the founders of Marxism. In his "Chinese Affairs", Marx wrote in 1862 that the Taipings "terrify the masses more than they do the old rulers. They seem to have made it their aim to replace the decay of stagnation with destruction in disgustingly ugly forms, destruction without any rudiments of creative work".²

The founders of scientific communism showed vast interest in the Indian problems too. Marx used Britain's colonial policy in India as an illustration of the European colonialists' predatory system of administration and merciless exploitation of Asian and African nations. "Profound hypocrisy and the barbarity inherent in bourgeois civilisation appear fully exposed in our eyes when we see this civilisation not at home, where it assumes respectable forms, but in the colonies, where it operates without any disguise."³ This conclusion in Marx's celebrated

article "The Future Results of British Rule in India" was the result of a vast job he had done in studying the history, economy and culture of a number of Asian and African countries.

Many works about the national liberation movement in Asia were written by Lenin. And that is only natural. The elaboration of the revolutionary theory of the national liberation movement required a thorough study of the destinies of the oppressed nations. The classics of Marxism-Leninism naturally could not confine themselves to the analysis and generalisation of the experience of liberation struggle accumulated only in Europe, by the Irish, Polish, Southern Slav and other peoples.

In writing their works about the national and colonial issues as well as about other problems of the world revolutionary process, Marx, Engels and Lenin proceeded from the wealth of experience mankind had acquired in its fight for liberation over the centuries. Marxism-Leninism has always been applied in different countries with due account of the prevailing situation, socio-economic conditions and historical traditions. Nevertheless, it has always remained what it is—the revolutionary theory of all the Communists of the world. There was and is no need to Russify, Americanise, etc., the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory. And if there were people risking Sinicising Marxism it was only logical that they would ultimately break with the universal system of communist views.

The Sinicisation of Marxism-Leninism was accompanied by a struggle in the Chinese Communist Party which it was possible to conceal for a time. The sweep and the character of this struggle and the alignment of forces are not fully known to this day. But the "proletarian cultural revolution", in the course of which Liu Shao-chi became the main object of the hungweipings' (the so-called red guards') attacks, revealed some very curious details

¹ Marx and Engels, *On Colonialism*, Moscow, 1965, p. 8.

² Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Vol. XV, Berlin, 1964, p. 514.

³ Marx and Engels, *On Colonialism*, p. 73.

of this struggle. One of the charges against Liu Shao-chi, for instance, is that it was on his initiative and at his insistence that the Chinese Communist Party Eighth Congress in 1956 inscribed in the new Rules it adopted that "in its activities the Chinese Communist Party is guided by Marxism-Leninism" instead of "Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of Mao Tse-tung", as stipulated in the Rules adopted by the Seventh Congress in 1945. If one bears in mind that the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" are the "Chinese form" of Marxism-Leninism, then one must say that the creator of these ideas definitely suffered a setback in 1956. This becomes all the more obvious when one recalls the article "More About the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship" in the *Jenminjihpao* (*People's Daily*) of December 29, 1956.

This well-known article was discussed at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee. It posed the question of combating the personality cult, nationalism and Great-Power chauvinism in socialist countries. "We Chinese," *Jenminjihpao* wrote, "must especially remember that during the Han, Tang, Ming and Ch'in dynasties our country was a great empire too." The paper further said that subsequently, for about 100 years, China was a semi-colony. And "although our country is now still economically and culturally backward, the tendency towards Great-Power chauvinism will undoubtedly become a serious danger when the conditions change, unless every step is taken to prevent it". *Jenminjihpao* stressed that the elimination of such tendencies required "systematic efforts".¹

And such efforts were indeed repeatedly undertaken. Nevertheless, Great-Power chauvinism prevailed. The "big leap" and "people's communes"

policy proclaimed in 1958 was first and foremost an expression of the Mao Tse-tung group's aspiration to leadership and hegemony in the world revolutionary movement. This was evidenced by the underlying idea of the policy: to reach the communist stage of development in China—no more and no less—within five years with the aid of the "big leap" and the "people's communes". As for the other socialist countries, they were either "marking time" or "restoring capitalism". The centre of the world revolutionary movement, Chinese propaganda began to insist, had shifted to China.

The failure of the "big leap" and the "people's communes" did not discourage Mao Tse-tung. The fact that a Chinese Communist Party delegation attended the Moscow Meeting in 1960 and signed the Statement did not mean, it later turned out, that Mao Tse-tung was ready to follow the general line of the international communist movement. This became perfectly clear following the appearance in 1963 of the notorious "Twenty-Five Points". They were included in the "Proposals for the General Line of the International Communist Movement" which, in Mao Tse-tung's opinion, should replace the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement. What he proposed was a line entirely different from the one collectively worked out by all the Communist Parties, including the Chinese. The Chinese proposals contained anti-Marxian, adventuristic provisions on the most important problems in the world socialist system, the national liberation movement and the working-class struggle in the capitalist countries.

Unbridled Great-Power ambitions led in the summer of 1966 to the outbreak of what came to be known as the "great proletarian cultural revolution". Petty-bourgeois nationalism and Great-Power chauvinism became the main feature and the motive force of the Mao Tse-tung group's home and foreign policies. The whole history of hungweiping outrages

¹ *More About the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1956, pp. 33-34.

shows that the "petty-bourgeois tails" Mao Tse-tung spoke of during the Second World War have turned into a weapon against the Party, the trade unions and the Young Communist League. The Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (August 1966) proclaimed Mao Tse-tung "the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our day" and "the greatest leader of the world revolution" which the hungweipings allegedly brought to a "new stage" of development.

The task the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party set themselves was to force the other Communist Parties to accept the anti-Marxist theories of Mao Tse-tung concerning the world revolutionary process. For several years now the demands for the recognition of these theories have been tantamount to claims to the leadership of the world revolutionary movement, notably the national liberation struggle. Those who reject these claims are branded by Chinese propaganda as "revisionists", "traitors to Marxism-Leninism", "enemies No. 1", etc. To achieve their aims, Mao Tse-tung and his group conduct large-scale splitting activities in the socialist countries, in the communist and working-class movement in the developed capitalist countries and among the national liberation forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Mao Tse-tung is not against unity but only if he dictates and propagates his anti-Marxist views which are proclaimed the "acme" of Marxism-Leninism. Such "unity" naturally has nothing in common with proletarian internationalism. During the Second World War the Chinese Communist Party resolutely rejected the attempts made by the "dictator", as Mao Tse-tung called Chiang Kai-shek, to "impose" his autocratic unity upon the Communists. The Communist Party was thus upholding democratic unity. And today Mao Tse-tung himself seeks to impose the same autocratic dictatorial unity on

the international revolutionary movement. That will never be of course. But it must be said at the same time that the unbridled campaign launched with the aim of establishing such "unity" is seriously threatening to split the world revolutionary movement, including the national liberation.

What basically are the views of Mao Tse-tung and his group about the national liberation movement and how does their splitting character manifest itself?

The Role of the National Liberation Movement in the World Revolutionary Process

For a long time the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party held the same view on this issue as the other Marxists-Leninists. In the article "On New Democracy", mentioned above, Mao Tse-tung stressed that the main force in the world socialist revolution which began in 1917 was the international proletariat and that the oppressed colonial and semi-colonial nations were its allies. Simultaneously, he spoke of the outstanding part played by the working class of the capitalist countries.¹

The fundamental importance of this view is obvious because it meant recognition of the fact that the leading role in the era ushered in by the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia is played by the working class. And the main content of this era is transition from capitalism to socialism on a world-wide scale. This assessment, given by the international communist movement, is based on the only correct analysis of the basic contradiction of our epoch—the contradiction between imperialism and socialism. These important Marxist-Leninist propositions were also formulated in the unanimously adopted documents of the Moscow meetings

¹ See Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 114.

of representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957 and 1960.

These documents highly appreciate the role played by the national liberation movement in the world-wide revolutionary process. "The breakdown of the system of colonial slavery under the impact of the national liberation movement," says the 1960 Statement, "is a development ranking second in historic importance only to the formation of the world socialist system."¹ At the same time the Communist Parties, including the Chinese Communist Party, deemed it necessary to lay special stress on the fact that the world socialist system now determined the main trend and main features of human society's historical development. "It is the principal characteristic of our time," their Statement says, "that the world socialist system is becoming the decisive factor in the development of society."²

The above-mentioned shows that the leading role in the world revolutionary process belongs to the international working class and its main creation, the world socialist system. The national liberation movement is without doubt a vast force that helps destroy imperialism. But it primarily solves the general democratic tasks of national liberation. Socially, the participants in this movement are an extremely heterogeneous mass. Their class interests, ideology and politics are different and sometimes diametrically opposed. The national liberation movement can be consummated and shunted onto the rails of the socialist revolution only if the leading role is played by the international working class, its politics and ideology. It goes without saying that the anti-imperialist revolution must be accomplished and the problems created by its devel-

opment into a socialist revolution solved by the national liberation forces themselves under the direction of their revolutionary parties and organisations.

Mao Tse-tung and his group completely repudiated Marxist-Leninist principles in the definition of the part played by the national liberation movement in the world revolutionary process. In their drive for hegemony, they seek to subordinate the liberation movement of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples. To achieve their aim, they court the liberation forces and attribute to them the qualities they do not as yet possess.

The letter of June 14, 1963, sent by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the CPSU Central Committee, contains the following assertion that underlies the Maoists' views about the national liberation movement: "Extensive areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America ... are the main zone of world revolutionary storms dealing a direct blow to imperialism." And further: "In a certain sense, the revolutionary cause of the international proletariat ultimately depends on the revolutionary struggle of the peoples that live in these regions and constitute the bulk of the world's population."¹

This letter and other Chinese Communist Party documents all affirm that the basic contradiction in the world today is the one between imperialism and the national liberation movement. Suffice it to name but a few articles in the leading Chinese publications which widely publicised this idea: "Workers and Oppressed Nations of the World, Unite!" in the *Jenminjhpao* of July 25, 1963, "The Apologists of Neo-Colonialism", an editorial published by *Jenminjhpao* and the magazine *Hungchi* on October 22, 1963, and many others.

Communist Parties in many countries drew atten-

¹ *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, Moscow, p. 61.

² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹ *Pravda*, July 14, 1963.

tion to the fact that the question of the national liberation movement's place and role was treated in much the same way in the "Twenty-Five Points" of the Chinese Communist Party and the documents of the present-day Trotskyites. One of the decisions of the so-called Fourth (Trotskyite) International said the "main centre of the world revolution has for a time shifted to the colonial world".¹ Such coincidence of views is not accidental. It testifies to the fact that both the Maoists and the Trotskyites mean to ignore the role of the world socialist system.

This alone explains the appearance of the nationalistic thesis that "the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind". Addressing the Moscow Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957, Mao Tse-tung said: "There is a Chinese saying: 'Either the East Wind prevails over the West Wind or the West Wind prevails over the East Wind.' I believe it is characteristic of the situation today that the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind."

And Mao Tse-tung therewith explained the meaning of this saying: at present, he said, "the forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism".² In this explanation Mao Tse-tung somewhat underestimated the forces of imperialism, and he did this in order to justify once again the notorious "paper tiger" thesis. By itself, this argument about the alignment of forces in the world is both logical and in line with the class approach to such problems. But it is absolutely wrong to formulate this as a "struggle of winds" inasmuch as there are imperialism and

¹ See *For the Unity of the International Communist Movement. Documents and Materials*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1964, p. 241.

² *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, Peking, 1966, p. 80.

socialism both in the East and in the West. A few years later it became clear that it was not for nothing that Mao Tse-tung had resort to such an allegory.

The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party dispensed with the explanation about the relation of the imperialist and socialist forces and began to talk openly about the meaning of the chosen allegory: the "East Wind" represented Asia, Africa and Latin America which, they claimed, were the main arena of the world revolutionary process. In this given case the class proletarian analysis was substituted for by a geographic and even racialist one.

Interesting in this connection are the talks Kenzo Matsumura of the Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party had with the Chinese leaders in Peking in 1959 and 1962. At a reception in the autumn of 1962, Matsumura said: "Premier Chou En-lai and Deputy Premier Chen Yi had many talks with us and said that East was East after all and that the Asians were destined to change world history. We must unite and strengthen the ties between our peoples who have the same colour of skin and the same written language."¹

How far the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party had then gone along the path of "Asian solidarity" was revealed by Mao Tse-tung's eulogy of the Japanese as "a great nation" because "it waged war against the United States. It fought Britain and France. It attacked Pearl Harbor and occupied Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia. Its advance reached the eastern part of India".² For the sake of solidarity on a racial basis, one can, it seems, go so far as to justify

¹ *Proletarian Internationalism Is the Banner of the Working People of All Countries and Continents*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1964, p. 25.

² *Pravda*, September 2, 1964.

Japanese aggression during the Second World War and eulogise the Japanese militarists who had drowned East and Southeast Asian countries in blood. As we see, the nationalist thesis of the "East Wind" was not used by the Maoists only to whip up nationalistic and racist prejudices in the countries of the Third World. They also resorted to it in courting the worst enemies of the national liberation movement.

Such courtship found definite expression in the "intermediate zone" conception, which Mao Tse-tung formulated in his talks with French M.P.s on January 30, 1964, and Japanese Socialists on July 10 of that same year. He first talked of one "intermediate zone" in which he included, first, the newly-independent states coming into existence as a result of the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism, secondly, the countries still held in colonial bondage and, thirdly, the imperialist powers—Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain and France. Subsequently, this "intermediate zone" was divided in two: the first "zone" was made to include the countries fighting for independence in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the second—the whole of Western Europe, Canada and Oceania. According to this theory, the imperialism of Japan and the West European countries is merely a "shadow" of U.S. imperialism, for these countries are to such an extent slighted by the United States that the contradictions between them and the United States can be compared to the contradictions between the national liberation movement and colonialism. And all this, taken together, is held out as a factor determining the historical process at the present stage.

The Communist Parties of many countries sharply criticised the "intermediate zone" theory. Here is what was said at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Indian Communist

Party in September 1964: "The so-called 'intermediate zone' theory is now revealed in all its ugliness—covering up class differences and differences in social systems."¹ The Central Committee of the Paraguayan Communist Party pointed out that the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party were deliberately embellishing the role of the aggressive colonial powers. "It was to succeed in confusing the issue that Comrade Mao Tse-tung and his disciples thought up this special conception of intermediate zone," it said.²

The Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany drew the Communists' attention to the fact that the "intermediate zone" theory "ignores the highly ill-famed aggressiveness of West German imperialism and aims at minimising its danger. And it is this that the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party dare to propose as a revolutionary policy to the German people and the peoples of the world who have quite often fallen victim to the predatoriness of German imperialism. This policy of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, who love to pose as champions of the national liberation movement, may also explain why they by-pass in profound silence the neo-colonialist policy of such an imperialist state of the 'intermediate zone' as West Germany".³

The national liberation movement is thus separated from the world socialist system and placed on the same plane with the imperialist, so-called second intermediate zone. What is more, the national liberation movement is constantly contraposed to the socialist countries. In all these conceptions, the People's Republic of China acts less as a socialist state than simply as an Asian country.

¹ *New Age*, Vol. XII, No. 38, Sept. 20, 1964, p. 19.

² *Pravda*, September 30, 1963.

³ *Pravda*, April 24, 1964.

Policy of "Self-Reliance"

The national liberation movement is also seriously jeopardised by the "self-reliance" theory. Like the other conceptions of Maoism, it is of a splitting nature.

Everyone knows the Marxist-Leninist thesis that the emancipation of the working people in all countries is in their own hands. But without international solidarity they will not achieve their aims. In the past Mao Tse-tung stressed time and again that in their struggle against imperialism people should first and foremost rely upon themselves. This assertion did not give rise to any doubts in other Communist Parties inasmuch as the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party at the same time spoke about the solidarity of the international revolutionary forces and friendship with the Soviet Union. During the war against the Japanese aggressors the Chinese Communist Party widely propagated the thesis that the Chinese people should not make the assistance received from the allies the sole basis of their confidence in victory. Victory required the marshalling of all the national resources.

The Communists were against the cultivation among the Chinese masses of the feeling that they must depend on somebody's assistance. And they were right because the liberation of any country from national and social bondage is first and foremost the affair of its own people. What is more, in those years the Chinese Communist Party did not urge the isolation of the Chinese people. On the contrary, it constantly stressed that it was extremely important for it to co-operate with the peoples of the Soviet Union and other countries of the anti-fascist coalition.

On April 24, 1945, at the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Tse-tung said

that "without the participation of the Soviet Union, the problems of the Pacific cannot be settled finally and thoroughly."¹ What this primarily meant was that the complete rout of the Japanese aggressors was inconceivable without the Soviet Union's participation in the war in the Far East. Shortly after the capitulation of nazi Germany the Soviet Union fulfilled its obligation as a member of the anti-fascist coalition in the Far East too. Japan surrendered four months after the end of the war in Europe, and not a year or year and a half as the British and U.S. commands expected.

Japanese imperialism was so strong during the Second World War that there was no chance of the Chinese people beating it without the support of the Soviet Union and other countries of the anti-fascist coalition. "The Red Army came to help the Chinese people drive the aggressors out," Mao Tse-tung wrote in those days. "No such thing had ever happened in the history of China. The impact of this event is immeasurable."² The defeat of Japan in 1945 is one of those very important factors without which it would have been impossible to consummate the people's revolution in China in 1949. Mao Tse-tung laid particular stress on this in the article "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", published on June 30, 1949.³

But even in those years there were people in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party who indulged in breeding anti-Soviet sentiment in the Party. As early as 1946 Peng Chen, Lin Feng and other Party leaders sought to minimise the role played in the Far East by the Soviet Armed Forces

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 302.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, 1964, Vol. IV, p. 508.

³ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, 1961, Vol. IV, p. 416.

and slandered the Soviet Union. Similar attempts were undertaken later on. Twice, in 1946 and 1949, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party condemned the anti-Soviet, nationalistic trends in the activities of the Peng Chen-Lin Feng group. Although the CC decision about this group was purely formal in character and the local Party organisations were not acquainted with it, it was nevertheless important. The anti-Soviet sentiment in the Chinese Communist Party then could not prevail over the realisation that friendship with the Soviet Union was of paramount significance for the Chinese people's victory over their numerous enemies.

Today, however, the Maoists grossly misrepresent the developments of those days, claiming that the rout of Japan in 1945 and the victory of the Chinese revolutionary forces in the civil war of 1946-49 were the result of the "Chinese people's reliance on their own forces". This is precisely what Defence Minister Lin Piao wrote in his sensational article "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" which was published on September 3, 1965, in all the Chinese newspapers and the *Hungchi* magazine. Lin Piao naturally did not forget to say that "the Chinese people received support from the people all over the world".¹ But there were only a few words about it at the beginning of the article and no analysis whatever of the relations and ties between the internal and external factors of victory. The whole of his composition was devoted to proving that "Japanese imperialism was smashed by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung".

¹ Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" (In Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of Victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan), Peking, 1965, p. 1.

This particular thesis is subjected in Lin Piao's article to all-round "analysis" and "substantiation".

The nature and volume of the assistance given the Chinese people by the Soviet Union and other socialist states after 1949 are distorted even more. The Maoists attach particular significance to such misinformation. It is a matter of vast, fundamental importance: of relation between the Chinese people's capacities and efforts in the struggle for socialism after the victory of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution, on the one hand, and the support given by the Soviet Union and other countries of the world socialist system, on the other.

Chinese propaganda's main thesis on this issue is that there was no such thing as Soviet assistance to the People's Republic of China. All there was from the day the People's Republic of China was proclaimed to the end of the 1950s was "ordinary trade deals". China allegedly relied solely on her "own forces".

The run of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China fully refutes this far-fetched thesis. The Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, concluded for thirty years in Moscow on February 14, 1950, and the nationalistic and anti-Soviet "self-reliance" thesis are poles apart. Besides political and military measures for the defence of the two countries against the imperialist aggressors, the treaty includes provisions on reciprocal economic commitments. Article 5 says the parties will expand and strengthen economic and cultural ties, render each other all possible economic assistance and promote economic co-operation. At the same time they signed a number of agreements.¹

Chou En-lai, who signed these documents on

¹ See *Soviet Foreign Policy. Documents and Materials, 1950*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1953, pp. 56-65.

behalf of the People's Republic of China, then said: "The treaty and agreements will give the Chinese people the feeling that they are not alone and help rehabilitate and develop the Chinese economy."¹

An important landmark in the life of the People's Republic of China was the first five-year plan (1953-57). Its main object was the priority development of heavy industry. The plan provided for the building of 1,600 major projects, 694 of them industrial enterprises to which the state attached particular importance. There were enormous difficulties to be overcome inasmuch as the People's Republic had inherited an extremely backward economy from semi-colonial China. At that time the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party took the realities into account and said it was impossible to create a highly-developed economy within a brief period of time. China's industrialisation was a colossal task which would take at least three five-year-plan periods to fulfil. Her transformation into a country with highly-developed industry and culture would require 40-45 years, practically the whole of the second half of the current century.²

It was, moreover, constantly stressed that fraternal assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was greatly accelerating China's socialist construction effort. This aid was indeed colossal. Under one of the agreements signed on February 14, 1950, the Soviet Union granted China a long-term credit to the amount of U.S. \$300 million on easy terms.³ China began to receive industrial equipment and raw and other materials in accordance with this credit agreement. In 1953 the Soviet Union agreed to help China build and rebuild 141

enterprises before the end of 1959. They included large power plants, metallurgical works, coal mines, etc. "History has never known anything like that," Mao Tse-tung then said.⁴

Slightly a year later, in October 1954, a new agreement was signed on long-term Soviet credits to China—this time for 520 million rubles. Also signed was a protocol on Soviet assistance in the building of an additional 15 enterprises and on the increase of the volume of equipment deliveries to the 141 enterprises.² An agreement on Soviet help in the construction of another 55 industrial enterprises at an over-all cost of 2,500 million rubles³ was signed in Peking on April 7, 1956. Of the 694 industrial projects of the first five-year plan, over 200 were thus built with the aid of the Soviet Union.

The U.S.S.R. granted the People's Republic of China long-term credits amounting to 1,816 million rubles on terms that were highly favourable for the latter.⁴

Together with the other European socialist countries, the Soviet Union helped China a great deal in building all the main branches of industry. Old China virtually had no engineering industry. All the People's Republic of China inherited was small repair shops. Aided by the Soviet Union, the Chinese people were by the end of the third year of the first five-year-plan period (1955) building planes, locomotives, ships, coalcutter-loaders, etc. By 1955 China's machine-tool industry had organised the production of more than 120 types of machine-tools.⁵ One of the biggest enterprises in this industry was the

¹ *Soviet Foreign Policy, Documents and Materials*, p. 69.

² See *People's China*, Russ. ed., No. 17, 1955, Supplement, p. 9.

³ See *Soviet Foreign Policy, Documents and Materials*, p. 64.

⁴ *Pravda*, September 18, 1953.

² See *Pravda*, October 12, 1954.

³ See *Pravda*, April 8, 1956.

⁴ See *For Unity of the International Communist Movement*, p. 206.

⁵ See *Friendship*, Russ. ed., Feb. 7, 1955.

Wuhan Heavy Machine-Tool Works. Before setting out to build it, China sent a large group of administrative and technical workers to be trained in the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. also helped rebuild the machine-tool works in Mukden.

China's first automobile works in Changchun was built with the all-round assistance of the Soviet Union. It was commissioned in 1955 and began to give the country 30,000 lorries a year.¹ Soviet specialists designed the works, drew up the estimates and trained the managerial staff and workers for it. The equipment, instruments and tools for China's first automobile works were made by enterprises in Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky, Kiev and other Soviet cities. Later, the Soviet Union helped build another automobile works. The enterprises of the automotive industry, built with Soviet assistance, accounted for 80 per cent of all lorries and tractors made in China.²

The Soviet Union helped the Chinese people substantially in the reconstruction and development of the iron and steel industry. There were quite many people in China who said it would take twenty years to restore the Anshan Iron and Steel Works.³ Despite this prophecy, the enterprise resumed operation in 1949 and in the first two years of the first five-year plan gave the country more metal than it had produced in all the twenty years of Japanese occupation.⁴ Soviet specialists designed a number of metallurgical works. Thousands of rationalisation proposals made by Chinese and Soviet engineers and technicians were put into effect. At the Anshan Iron and Steel Works alone Soviet

¹ See *People's China*, Russ. ed., No. 17, 1955, Supplement, p. 13.

² See *For Unity of the International Communist Movement*, p. 206.

³ See *Friendship*, Russ. ed., July 16, 1955.

⁴ *Ibid.*

specialists made about 30,000 rationalisation proposals. Many Chinese metallurgical enterprises were equipped with Soviet machinery. Soviet specialists helped build the new iron and steel works in Wuhan and Paotow.

The iron and steel works built and rebuilt with Soviet assistance have made it possible for China to produce 8,700,000 tons of cast iron and 8,400,000 tons of steel a year.¹

Scientific and technical co-operation proceeded apace. Between 1954 and 1963 the Soviet Union gave China free of charge more than 24,000 sets of scientific and technical documentation, including blueprints for 1,400 large enterprises.² More than 10,000 Soviet specialists were sent to China between 1950 and 1960 at her government's request to work there, and about 10,000 Chinese engineers, technicians and workers, as well as about 1,000 scientists, underwent training in the Soviet Union from 1951 to 1962. Moreover, 11,000 students and post-graduate students completed their education in Soviet institutions.³

Such was the selfless Soviet assistance the Chinese people received after they had set out to build a new life. This assistance and the Chinese people's valiant labour efforts favourably influenced the process of revolutionary transformations in China.

Stressing the importance of the support given the People's Republic of China in its economic development by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, Mao Tse-tung said on February 27, 1957: "In order to turn our country into an industrial power, we must learn conscientiously from the advanced experience of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union

¹ See *For Unity of the International Communist Movement*, p. 206.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

has been building socialism for forty years, and we treasure its experience. Let us consider who designed and equipped so many important factories for us? Was it the United States? Or Britain? No, neither of them. Only the Soviet Union was willing to do so because it is a socialist country and our ally. In addition to the Soviet Union, some brother countries of Eastern Europe also gave us assistance."¹

In 1958, however, there appeared increasing hegemonic and nationalistic trends in the Chinese Government's policy towards the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Subsequently, ideological differences were shifted to interstate, economic and cultural relations which the Chinese began rapidly to curtail. In 1962, for instance, the volume of economic co-operation between China and the Soviet Union (including trade and technical assistance) declined to 36.5 per cent of the 1959 level and deliveries of complete plant decreased by 97.5 per cent.²

China's self-isolation from fraternal states has badly affected her socialist development and caused anxiety among Communists the world over.

Moreover, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party began to persuade the leaders of the national liberation forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America that the only correct policy for them was "self-reliance".

In a "talk with African friends" on August 8, 1963, Mao Tse-tung advocated such a policy in its nationalistic interpretation.³ It was in this interpretation too that the policy was discussed during the

Chinese leaders' talks with Kenzo Matsumura. "We reached a perfect accord on the point that Asian countries should work out their salvation by their own efforts as the only way to promote Asian prosperity and elevate the living standards of Asian peoples," Matsumura said later.

The propaganda of the "self-reliance" policy among the Asian, African and Latin American countries aims at isolating the national liberation movement from the world socialist system. The Chinese leaders are trying to replace the well-known Leninist slogan of "Workers of all countries and oppressed peoples, unite!" with appeals to the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to act separately from one another, on a nationalist basis. They have gone so far as to affirm that the national liberation movement can succeed even without the assistance of the international working class. Such is the gist not only of the letter of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee of June 14, 1963, but of many other documents issued by the Chinese leaders. But all this is refuted by the history of both the anti-imperialist and socialist revolution in China and the national liberation movement in general.

Suffice it to recall that the crisis of the colonial system of imperialism was ushered in by the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia. The Russian Empire, one of the biggest in the world insofar as the number of colonial possessions was concerned, went out of existence. The revolution, which triumphed under the banner of proletarian internationalism, led to the transformation of the gigantic prison of peoples that was Russia of the bourgeois and the landowners into a fraternal community of nations. All this exerted an enormous revolutionising influence on the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Lenin wrote of the growth of a mighty demo-

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, Peking, 1957, pp. 69-70.

² See *For the Unity of the International Communist Movement. Documents and Materials*, p. 208.

³ See *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 177-78.

cratic movement in Asia as early as the beginning of the current century, stressing that hundreds of millions of people were awakening to life, light and freedom. The Great October Revolution was conducive to the final transformation of the Eastern nations "into an active factor in world politics and in the revolutionary destruction of imperialism".¹ The colonialists were powerless to stop the mighty liberation movement in enslaved Asia. In those days, however, there were still 1,230 million people living in the colonies, semi-colonies and dependencies, or 69.2 per cent of the world's total population.

After the Second World War the crisis of the colonial system ended in its disintegration. And this was directly due to the vast contribution to the development of the world revolutionary process that is constantly being made by the Soviet Union. It should particularly be stressed that the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War played a huge role in creating favourable conditions for a new stage in the oppressed nations' liberation struggle. This especially applies to the fight waged by the Asian peoples against the Japanese invaders whom Mao Tse-tung deemed it necessary to extol for the sake of "Asian solidarity" in 1964.

It should be borne in mind too that resistance to the Japanese was in some countries hampered by the serious delusions and errors on the part of many honest patriots as to the nature of Japanese policies. There were widespread illusions about Japan's true intentions on the eve and at the beginning of the war. The Japanese imperialists' political manoeuvres and lying propaganda about Asia's "liberation" from the European and American colonialists at first succeeded in poisoning the minds of certain people in Asian countries. The beastly colonial yoke

drove the colonial nations into any alliance so long as it promised to lead to the expulsion of British, French, Dutch and American oppressors. The Japanese made good use of this to publicise their "liberation" mission. But the Asian peoples soon learned by experience that the "yellow" imperialists were just as bad enemies of freedom and independence as the "white" ones. There could be no liberation without a resolute struggle against both the former and the latter. And so puppet cliques were alone on the side of the occupation forces until the end of the war.

The Soviet Union's entry into the war in the Far East in August 1945 created especially favourable political conditions for intensifying the national liberation movement in Asian countries: first, because the oppressed peoples had driven the Japanese out and, secondly, because the conditions were conducive to their liberation from the old masters—the French, British, Dutch and other colonialists.

Such a situation arose because the crushing blows Soviet troops dealt the Japanese Kwantung Army quickly ended the Pacific War—it was all over at the beginning of September 1945. The Western Powers had had no time to ship sufficiently strong troop contingents to replace the surrendering Japanese. The peoples of East and Southeast Asia took full advantage of this: the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed on August 17 and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 2, 1945.

It should be noted that in August 1945 the Soviet Armed Forces liberated not only China's Northeast but also Korea. "During the darkest years of Japanese domination," Kim Il Sung wrote, "we turned with hope to the land of socialism, and this hope was vindicated."¹ Here is another important fact:

¹ Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, pp. 454-55.

¹ *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, November 2, 1951.

the 80,000-strong army of another socialist state, the Mongolian People's Republic, also took part in the Manchurian operation in 1945.

Speaking at the 23rd CPSU Congress, Chairman S.A. Dange of the National Council of the Indian Communist Party recalled that the heroic struggle waged by the imperialist-oppressed peoples, including the peoples of China and India, ended in victory only because the Red Army had made its decisive contribution to the rout of fascism. This led to the establishment of the world socialist system and accelerated the collapse of the colonial system of oppression. It was only after this that India won her independence in 1947 and that people's democracy triumphed in China in 1949.

More than seventy sovereign states rose from the ruins of imperialism's colonial system after the Second World War. In 1968 there remained only slightly over 30 million people living in the colonies and semi-colonies. And fifty years ago there were 1,230 million. But the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries cannot reconcile themselves to the existence of even insignificantly small remnants of colonial empires. Spokesmen for the peoples fighting with arms in hand for their national liberation have time and again referred to the vast significance of the support given them by the socialist countries. At the international seminar on the subject of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America, held in Baku in September 1967, Marcelino dos Santos of the Mozambique Liberation Front stressed that "the peoples waging an armed struggle for their liberation are inspired by the ideas of the Great October Revolution and assiduously study the experience of the socialist countries. We highly appreciate the material, moral and other assistance given fighting Africa

by the socialist countries, particularly by the U.S.S.R."¹

One of the leaders of the Angolan patriotic forces, Antonio Agostinho Neto, said in 1966: "Angola will never forget the enormous assistance the Soviet Union is rendering to the liberation movement."² The leaders of the African Party of Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands also have repeatedly stated in their documents that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are generously helping patriots fighting against the Portuguese colonialists.

Mao Tse-tung and his group know very well that there has never been a national liberation movement in the world that the socialist countries have not supported in one way or another. First the Soviet Union alone and then the world socialist system pinned down the vast forces of imperialism, thus facilitating the struggle in the colonies. Despite all their heroism and sacrifices, the oppressed nations would never have achieved victory had not the socialist revolutions in Russia and in some other countries in Europe and Asia shaken imperialism to its foundation and undermined the colonialists' strength.

But the struggle does not end with the destruction of colonial regimes in their classical form. The achievement of political independence by the former colonies does not put a stop to the imperialist monopolies' assault on them. The newly-independent states cannot withstand this assault by themselves. To defeat neo-colonialism, which often manifests itself in the most subtle forms, the new states need constant support in the economic, cultural and military spheres. Many of them are vitally interested in

¹ *Pravda*, September 22, 1967.

² *Pravda*, April 22, 1966.

establishing and promoting close, all-round ties with the world socialist system. "The national liberation movement," the Lebanese Communist Party said in one of its statements, "can uphold and consolidate its achievements and gain final victory only in close alliance with the countries of the socialist camp and its vanguard, the Soviet Union, and with their material and moral support."¹

As for the Soviet Union, it regards fraternal alliance with the nations that have broken out of colonial and semi-colonial bondage as one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy.

The Soviet Union grants loans and credits to newly-independent states, co-operates with them in the building of industrial enterprises and other projects, helps them train specialists, trades with them, and so on. The over-all credits it has granted the developing countries exceed 3,500 million currency rubles.

Many industrial, agricultural and other enterprises are being built with Soviet technical assistance. In 1967 there were about 600 of them either completed or under construction in Afro-Asian countries. They included 14 iron and steel works, 40 engineering plants, 55 food factories, 28 thermal and hydropower stations, 14 light-industry enterprises, and 57 transport and communication installations. More than 100 research, educational and medical institutions have been or are being built in developing countries. Between 1960 and 1966 the number of Soviet doctors, teachers and other specialists in the cultural field working in 28 Afro-Asian countries increased by 300 per cent.

New states are also assisted by other socialist countries. The total sum of long-term credits they had received from the states associated with the

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was upwards of 5,000 million rubles in 1967. The CMEA countries are giving economic and technical help to more than 50 Afro-Asian and Latin American states, in which about 2,000 industrial projects have either been commissioned or are under construction. This assistance enabled the developing countries in 1960-66 to increase the output of electricity by 33 per cent, steel by over 100 per cent, oil products by 66 per cent, sugar by 50 per cent and cement by 11 per cent.

In assisting the developing countries, the Soviet Union and other socialist states make certain material sacrifices, but do it willingly for the sake of speeding up the progress of the nations that have shaken off the colonial fetters. It is indeed a magnificent international feat! The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are vitally interested in seeing the new Afro-Asian states achieve real independence. And it can be achieved only if political independence is reinforced by economic.

The effect of the economic and cultural assistance given by socialist states to the developing countries as a weapon of anti-imperialist struggle may be gauged by what some prominent Americans say. Columnist Walter Lippmann wrote in this connection that the underdeveloped countries no longer depended on the United States because there was an alternative source from which they could obtain capital goods and technical assistance. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a competitor was one of the greatest historic developments of the day, he said. It radically altered the position of the United States and its allies and vastly increased the strength of the developing countries.

Summing up the experience of financing the developing countries in his book *The Diplomacy of Economic Development*, the well-known American financier Eugene R. Black is forced to admit that

¹ *Pravda*, September 4, 1963.

they find communism an enticing proposition. First, he writes, the leaders of the developing countries are attracted by the Communists' criticism of the Western colonialists and, secondly, communism offers an efficient programme for rapid economic development. Stressing the effect of financial, trade and other ties between the socialist and developing countries he arrives at the conclusion that "economic aid, after all, does not just subsidise people; it influences events".¹

Such arguments are often to be met with in the capitalist press and political books. They show that the Western politicians do not ignore such an important factor of the international situation as the constant support of the national liberation movement by socialist states. The imperialist governments are taking appropriate steps to counter it. At the same time one can cite any number of statements by statesmen, public personalities and governments of the developing countries to the effect that they are vitally interested in strengthening friendship with the socialist countries. They highly appreciate the support given them by the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

Despite all these self-evident facts, Mao Tse-tung and his followers affirm that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries regard assistance to the oppressed nations "as a burden or favour".² Consequently, they allege, there is nothing left the colonies and the newly-independent countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America but to rely on themselves.

Moreover, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are said to be substituting "real" and

"genuine" support of the victims of colonialism by such "sham" support as the struggle for peace, international security and peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems.

National Liberation Movement and Peaceful Coexistence

Violent sallies on the Leninist policy of struggle for peace and international security have become a component of the Maoist conceptions of the world revolutionary process. Mao Tse-tung and his followers have gone so far as to claim that the struggle for peace and the national liberation movement are incompatible.

It is well known that the fundamental principles of socialist foreign policy—proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence—came into being simultaneously and were proclaimed in one and the same document—the Decree on Peace. They were engendered by the Great October Socialist Revolution and were both designed from the very first to serve the interests of all the peoples of the world. Lenin in fact convincingly proved as far back as during the Brest-Litovsk peace talks in 1917-18 that it was wrong to contrapose the struggle for peace to revolution. The Leninist foreign policy and diplomacy, which led to the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty (although on exceptionally onerous terms for the Soviet Republic), did a great service to the world revolutionary movement, and to the countries of the East in particular.

The Communist International likewise stressed time and again that the Soviet Union's consistent championship of international peace and security fully accorded with the interests of both the anti-colonial revolutions and the world revolutionary process in general. The Sixth Congress of the Communist International in 1928, for instance, empha-

¹ Eugene R. Black, *The Diplomacy of Economic Development*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960, p. 57.

² See the Letter of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of June 14, 1963, in *Pravda*, July 14, 1963.

sised that the peaceful policy pursued by the Soviet Union was one of the forms of fighting capitalism and that it was fully in the interests of the international proletariat. The Congress branded as slander the allegations that the peace policy of the Soviet Union implied that the "Soviet State has become reconciled with capitalism".¹

The Soviet Union and the revolutionary forces the world over made an outstanding contribution to the formation and the all-round consolidation of the anti-fascist coalition during the Second World War. The Soviet Union and the fraternal Communist Parties held that without the rout of fascism it would be impossible to make any progress and still less to achieve communist ideals. Hence their firm determination to overcome everything that hampered the unity of all the enemies of fascism on both national and international scale.

The Soviet experience of participating in the anti-fascist coalition proves false the Mao Tse-tung group's claims that co-operation between the socialist and capitalist countries on the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence is tantamount to the capitulation of socialist foreign policy to the imperialist forces. It is well known that there was no such thing as the "capitulation" of the Western Powers to Moscow or of Moscow's "capitulation" to Washington and London. Though it entered into a coalition with the United States and Great Britain to smash the fascist aggressors, the Soviet Union continued in the specific conditions prevailing then to fulfil its internationalist duty to the world revolutionary movement.

The Soviet Union, being a member of the anti-fascist coalition, always championed the interests of the peoples of the colonial, semi-colonial and

dependent countries in their struggle against British, French and other colonialists. At the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, for instance, the United States tried to get the Soviet Union to recognise (what is more, in writing) the notorious Open Door Policy in China. The proposal was made in Averell Harriman's memorandum of July 28, 1945.¹ There was naturally no chance of its success. During all the discussions of the colonial problems in 1945—at the Yalta, San Francisco and Potsdam conferences—the Soviet Union invariably sided with the oppressed nations. Commenting on the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, the *New York Post* wrote that the peoples of India, China and Africa would always remember that in San Francisco the Soviet Union stood for the independence of the colonial nations.²

Lenin stressed that it was necessary to fight world imperialism but that it was also necessary to know how to fight it. Soviet participation in the anti-fascist coalition is an excellent illustration of skilful struggle against imperialism in the interest of all progressive forces and the national liberation movements all over the world. All the foreign policy actions undertaken by the Soviet Union after the Second World War on the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence also accorded with the interests of the oppressed peoples' struggle for the abolition of all forms of enslavement. Here are some particularly interesting facts concerning China.

During the civil war in China (1946-49) the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic relations with the Kuomintang Government. Soviet troops in China's Northeast (Manchuria) were all withdrawn by May 3, 1946. The Soviet Government then re-

¹ *The Struggle Against Imperialist War and the Tasks of the Communists*, New York, 1932, p. 30.

¹ *United States Relations with China*, Washington, 1949, p. 118.

² *New York Post*, May 22, 1945.

peatedly reaffirmed its policy of non-interference in Chinese domestic affairs. It severed its relations with the Kuomintang Government on October 2, 1949, that is, on the day after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China.

Did all this mean that the Soviet Union was indifferent to the destinies of the Chinese revolution and the outcome of the struggle in China?

The answer to this question is given by numerous Chinese and Soviet documents. The Soviet Union supported the revolutionary forces of China, and this was in no way affected by its relations with the Kuomintang regime, the United States and other imperialist states on the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence. Incidentally, the treaty of friendship and alliance concluded by the governments of the Soviet Union and Kuomintang China on August 14, 1945, fully accorded with this principle. In those days many members of the Chinese Communist Party erroneously thought that the treaty militated against the revolutionary forces.

In view of this, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party undertook to explain the treaty to the Communists and progressive elements. "The Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and alliance and the agreements," Chou En-lai said, "fully accord with the Chinese people's revolution."¹ The Chinese Party leaders pointed out that the treaty of August 14, 1945 was very important both for the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communist Party. What was good for the Soviet Union, they stressed, was good for the Chinese Communist Party. This view was repeatedly voiced in subsequent years. In 1950, for instance, the Hsinhua News Agency said in an article that the treaty and the agreements "accorded with the interests of the Chinese and

Soviet peoples in their struggle against imperialism at the time when China was ruled by the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang clique".¹

The Chinese Party leaders did not draw a line between the Soviet Union's support of the revolutionary forces of China and its struggle for international security and peace. They did not say, either Soviet-American co-operation on the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence or Soviet assistance to the Chinese revolution, for they are incompatible. On the contrary. Mao Tse-tung recognised that such different trends in the complex international policy of a socialist state were quite compatible. "Much in the development of the international situation will depend on relations between the Soviet Union and the United States," he stressed in 1945. "It is therefore necessary to avoid a conflict between them. . . . The conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese treaty eliminates the possibility of a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States over China and makes it difficult for the United States to interfere openly in relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, on the side of the Kuomintang and against the Communist Party, and this is very important."²

There is yet another document of those years that pertains to the question under discussion. It is Mao Tse-tung's circular "Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation" addressed to the leading Party functionaries in the spring of 1946. It begins thus: "The forces of world reaction are definitely preparing a third world war, and the danger of war exists. But the democratic forces of the people of the world have surpassed the reactionary forces and are forging ahead; they must and

¹ M. S. Kapitsa, *Soviet-Chinese Relations*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, p. 325.

¹ *On Sino-Soviet Friendship*, Peking, 1950, p. 58.

² See Y. Y. Bogush, *Myth of the "Export of Revolution" and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Russ. ed., p. 108.

certainly can overcome the danger of war." Among the major factors of peace struggle Mao Tse-tung cited foreign policy compromises between the United States, Britain and France, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. "Such compromise," he said, "does not require the people in the countries of the capitalist world to follow suit and make compromises at home."¹

For several years after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China its leaders unreservedly backed the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems. In their statements then there was not the least inclination to contrapose the policy of supporting the national liberation movements to the policy of strengthening world peace and security. In 1957, at the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet session held on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Mao Tse-tung said: "The many proposals made by the Soviet Union for the reduction of armaments and for the prohibition of the production, testing and use of weapons of mass destruction are an expression of the attitude of all the socialist countries and are, at the same time, in the interests of all the peoples of the world. We are decisively in favour of peaceful competition between the socialist and capitalist countries."²

Since 1958, and particularly following the failure of the adventurist "big leap" plan, Mao Tse-tung's and his followers' opinion of the significance of the struggle for peace for the successful development of the national liberation movements has undergone a considerable change. They no longer see any use for the Afro-Asian nations in the

measures undertaken by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to strengthen international security. They affirm that such measures will only "restrain the revolutionary struggle" of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, that the CPSU and other Communist Parties allegedly seek to substitute peaceful coexistence for the revolutionary struggle of all oppressed nations, and that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries preach that "in such peaceful competition imperialism will collapse by itself and the oppressed nations need only calmly and quietly wait for this day".¹

This spirit permeates all of the Maoists' slanderous allegations about the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. They are doing everything to discredit the principle of peaceful coexistence in the eyes of the Afro-Asian and Latin American peoples as something incompatible with the interests of the national liberation struggle and the world revolutionary movement in general. Why? Hadn't Mao Tse-tung said often enough in the past that they were fully compatible?

Many Communist Parties have noted the following as an indisputable truth. In 1958 the Chinese Government embarked upon the production of its own nuclear weapons, and this policy became a component part of the Chinese leaders' Great-Power and hegemonic ambitions. To justify it China's diplomacy and propaganda began openly to stress their interest in the aggravation of international tension. And it is this tension, the main source of which is always naturally imperialism, that the Chinese theoreticians have proclaimed highly useful for the world revolutionary process

¹ See the Letter of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of June 14, 1963; "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism" (*Jenminjhpao* and *Hungchi* of October 22, 1963) and "Two Diametrically Opposite Policies of Peaceful Coexistence" (*Jenminjhpao* and *Hungchi* of December 12, 1963).

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, 1961, p. 87.

² *Fortieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Speeches and Greetings*, Moscow, 1958, p. 77.

in general and the national liberation struggle in particular.

The overwhelming majority of the Communist Parties have sharply censured the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and condemned their attempts to impose its conceptions upon the revolutionary forces of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The statement made by the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party said contemporary history indisputably repudiated all the allegations that the Soviet Union or the policy of peaceful coexistence or the demands for disarmament were hampering or slowing down the national liberation of the colonial or former colonial peoples.¹ The Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party, in its statement on the Chinese Communist Party's "Twenty-Five Points", particularly stressed that "the struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence leads to the weakening of the world imperialist front and to the isolation of the most aggressive elements from the masses, and creates better conditions for the national liberation movement and the proletariat's revolutionary struggle in all countries".²

The People's Vanguard Party of Costa Rica condemned Mao Tse-tung's recommendations to the Latin American Communists in which he said that the "cold war is a good thing" and that a "tense situation is a good situation" for the development of revolutionary struggle.³ Mao Tse-tung made these recommendations to the leaders of the Latin American Communist Parties who visited China in 1959. They included representatives of the Costa Rican Communists and one of them later

¹ *Pravda*, April 14, 1964.

² *Pravda*, August 20, 1963.

³ See *Pravda*, September 8, 1963.

wrote that in his talk with them Mao Tse-tung characterised "brinkmanship" as a "brilliant thing that must replace the policy of peaceful coexistence". He then said: "Who stands to gain from international tension? The United States? Britain? The world proletariat? Therein lies the problem. I think that none of you should be afraid of international tension. I personally like international tension."¹

The Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus (AKEL) denounced the Mao Tse-tung conceptions about Cyprus as adventuristic and dangerous for the national liberation movement. At the end of 1963 this problem became especially acute following NATO's opposition to the Cypriots' urge to annul the shackling agreements imposed upon them by the British colonialists in 1959, before Cyprus had become independent. The peace forces, with the active participation of the Soviet Union, prevented NATO from invading Cyprus. And the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party went so far as to say that by its peace policy the Soviet Union ... had saved the aggressive NATO bloc from disintegration.

"The Chinese leaders," AKEL Deputy General Secretary Andreas Fantis said, "being true to their position and thinking only of themselves and not the people, argued thus: let a war break out in the Mediterranean and let Greece and Turkey, both of them NATO members, go to war with each other. But do they think of the Cypriot people, does the destiny of the Greek and Turkish peoples worry them? There is only one answer—of course not."²

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has always rejected the alternative of either support for the national liberation movements or peaceful

¹ *Izvestia*, June 18, 1964.

² *Pravda*, April 9, 1964.

coexistence. The history of international relations and the world revolutionary process since 1917 has proved graphically that the principle of peaceful coexistence is a revolutionary one and is always taken into account by the Communist Parties in mapping revolutionary strategy. The Soviet Union supports the revolutionary, notably the national liberation, forces and at the same time does everything to prevent a world thermonuclear war.

Attempts to Impose Chinese Methods on National Liberation Movements

The crisis and disintegration of the colonial system have created conditions for the appearance of a vast number of different means, methods and forms of struggle against imperialism in Asian, African and Latin American countries. It could not be otherwise, for the anti-imperialist forces fought and are fighting in extremely different socio-economic and political conditions, in countries with their specific peculiarities and traditions.

The experience accumulated by the national liberation movement in each separate country is a definite contribution to the peoples' over-all struggle against imperialism. It has become a normal procedure in relations among the revolutionary forces of different countries to respect this experience, creatively to study it, to share it with one another and never to duplicate it mechanically or impose their parties' revolutionary experience upon other parties. This, however, clearly does not suit the Mao Tse-tung group, for it in no way accords with their hegemonic ambitions.

Right up to its victory in 1949 the Chinese revolution proceeded in the form of armed struggle against numerous internal and external enemies. Its main force was the peasantry. (The centre of the Chinese Communist Party's activity gradually

moved into the countryside and remained there for about twenty years.) It was out of the peasants that the People's Liberation Army was formed and it was they too who constituted the bulk of the Communist Party membership. Suffice it to say that in 1949 the workers accounted for 2-3 per cent of the Party members, the peasants for about 80 per cent, and representatives of the other classes for the rest. Even in 1956, when the Party held its Eighth Congress, 69 per cent of its members were peasants, 14 per cent were workers and 12 per cent were intellectuals.

In the course of the revolutionary wars the Chinese Communist Party worked out a military-political doctrine, the strategy and tactics suiting the country's conditions. Generally speaking, the Chinese revolutionary forces established bases in the countryside and thence conducted operations for years against the cities, where the reactionary Kuomintang concentrated its forces.

Mao Tse-tung has long been absolutising the experience of the Chinese revolution and particularly that of guerilla warfare. Speaking at the Plenary Meeting of the Party's Central Committee on November 6, 1938, he said: "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries." And further: "Every Communist must grasp the truth: 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'."¹ This is an absolutely clear and definite formulation of his "universal" method for both the struggle waged by the workers in the capitalist countries and the colonial national liberation movements. All forms and methods of

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Peking, 1965, pp. 219, 272.

struggle are reduced to actions with the aid of a gun. The experience of the Chinese revolution is thus turned into a universal law.

It is noteworthy that the conclusions above contradict his own numerous assertions about the harm of a one-sided approach to the analysis of social development. "In studying a problem," he wrote in 1937, "we must guard against subjectivism, one-sidedness and superficiality."¹ In that same year he warned: "Only those are bound to stumble who look at problems subjectively, one-sidedly and superficially."² In 1945 he wrote: "In this world, things are complicated and are decided by many factors. We should look at problems from different aspects, not from just one."³ And here is another precept, dated 1935: "In approaching a problem a Marxist should see the whole as well as the parts. A frog in a well says, 'The sky is no bigger than the mouth of the well.' That is untrue, for the sky is not just the size of the mouth of the well. If it said, 'A part of the sky is the size of the mouth of the well,' that would be true, for it tallies with the facts."⁴

The Maoists' approach to the problem of forms of national liberation struggle would "tally with the facts" if it took into account the experience of all countries and not just that of China. But, to quote Mao Tse-tung, they now look at problems "subjectively, one-sidedly and superficially".

Mao Tse-tung and his followers ignore the important fact that the existence of the world socialist system exerts a profound influence on the con-

tent and forms of national liberation struggle. In these conditions the peoples' victorious struggle for the abolition of colonial regimes is being fought both with arms and without them. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist Party leaders are absolutising the armed forms of struggle and denigrating the national liberation forces which have won independence for their countries without bloodshed.

The Chinese leaders' insistence on armed struggle everywhere is nothing but an attempt to push the anti-imperialist forces onto the path of adventure. Experience shows that those who follow such recommendations and do not take into account the prevailing conditions doom themselves to isolation, make senseless sacrifices and are beginning to retard their countries' social progress instead of promoting it.

The absolutisation of the Chinese experience of armed struggle has found its fullest expression in the above-mentioned "Long Live the Victory of People's War!". In this article Chinese Defence Minister Lin Piao claims that Mao Tse-tung's "theory of people's war" is of universal character and "has not only been valid for China".¹ And this "theory of people's war" is basically a generalisation of guerilla warfare in China.

Speaking of the specifics of the Chinese people's war, Lin Piao writes: "To rely on the peasants, build rural base areas and use the countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities—such was the way to victory in the Chinese revolution."² The Chinese Defence Minister would like to extend this specifically Chinese way to the whole of the world revolutionary process. This is how he argues in this instance: if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world", then Asia,

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 26.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Peking, 1965, p. 290.

³ *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, Peking, 1966, p. 216.

⁴ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Peking, 1965, p. 159.

¹ Lin Piao, *Long Live the Victory of People's War!*, p. 43.

² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world". In a sense, he continues, the contemporary world revolution presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas.¹

Lin Piao thus opposes the population of one part of the globe to that of another, without bothering to make any class analysis. The main thing for this newly-baked theorist is to impose the absolutised Chinese experience on the whole world. And he does not forget to stress that the Chinese experience of people's war has allegedly proved that "all reactionary forces are paper tigers". The real author of this conclusion is, as is well known, Mao Tse-tung. In a talk with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong in August 1946 he said: "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. . . . All reactionaries are paper tigers."²

The absolute majority of the Communist Parties have rebuffed the Mao Tse-tung group's attempts to force the experience of the Chinese revolution upon them and condemned its adventuristic policy concerning nuclear weapons. Despite their appreciation of the victorious Chinese revolution, the Communist Parties realise the harm of mechanically duplicating the revolutionary experience of others, wherever it may come from.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ceylon declared in this connection in October 1963 that the question of whether transition to socialism in a given country is to be effected by peaceful or non-peaceful means should be decided by the fraternal party of that country on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the prevailing

situation. The insistence on armed struggle and turning it into a universal law of transition to socialism may do a bad service to the fraternal parties, it added.¹

Rodney Arismendi, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Uruguayan Communist Party, stressed at the Party's 19th Congress in 1966 that heroism manifested itself in different ways. There was the heroism of a soldier and a guerilla. And there was another heroism—that of doing everyday revolutionary work. He paid tribute to the heroism of the man delivering Party newspapers, of the propagandist, the orator, the man posting proclamations, working with the masses, and so on. Anyone incapable of this heroism, he said, was incapable of standing torture and would betray his comrades.

The leaders of the People's Unity Party of Haiti wrote some time ago that in the conditions created by the terrorist regime in their country the Haitian revolutionaries consider it indispensable to prepare the masses for armed struggle against Duvalier's cutthroats. "But," they say, "unlike some hapless ultra-Radicals, we do not reduce anti-government and revolutionary actions to armed struggle. Armed action without a well-developed political movement of the masses will not yield the desired effect."²

The forms of action undertaken by the anti-imperialist forces are decided upon by these forces themselves with due account of the existing possibilities and national peculiarities and conditions. For instance, there was nothing left the Vietnamese people in 1946 but to rise in arms against the

¹ Lin Piao, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, Peking, 1961, p. 100.

¹ *Pravda*, October 14, 1963.

² Jacques Dorcilier and Manuel Sundiata, "The Haitian People's Revolutionary Struggle", *Partiinaya Zhizn (Party Life)*, No. 8, Moscow, 1967, p. 75.

French colonialists. Today too the Vietnamese see no way other than armed resistance to the American aggressors. The same applies to the Algerian people who fought a national liberation war from 1954 to 1962. The patriotic forces of Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea and other countries are fighting for their independence with arms in hand. The peoples of India, Morocco, Tunisia, Guinea, Mali and many other former colonies, on the other hand, won national independence without resorting to war.

Just as diverse may be the means and forms of the peoples' struggle for social progress after they have won political independence. Some of them, for instance, have chosen the non-capitalist path of development.

Speaking of the possibilities of such means, Lenin warned in his speech at the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920 that the necessary means for this could not be indicated in advance. "These will be prompted by practical experience," he said.¹ As was to have been expected, this experience proved to be highly diverse. In the conditions of the Soviet system and under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, many peoples of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Siberia by-passed the capitalist formation in their transition from pre-capitalist relations to socialism. There is much that is unique in the experience of the Mongolian People's Republic, which also by-passed the capitalist path of development. It should be noted that the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party did not at once become Marxist-Leninist and was at first a revolutionary-democratic party.

At present the path of non-capitalist development has been taken by the peoples of the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Burma, Syria, Guinea, the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Moscow, 1966, Vol. 31, p. 244.

Brazzaville Congo, Tanzania and other countries. They are liquidating foreign monopolies, nationalising enterprises belonging to local capitalists, confiscating feudal estates, etc. Clearly manifest in their activity is the following tendency: if, upon acquiring independence, a former colony takes consistent, resolute anti-imperialist measures it is bound with time to embark upon the path of non-capitalist transformations. Lenin noted this tendency too.

In their talks with a CPSU delegation in Moscow in July 1963, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, declared point-blank that the thesis about the non-capitalist path was "idle talk".¹ Why? Because, it turns out, such a path is contrary to Mao Tse-tung's theory of universal armed struggle. Many parties which have chosen the non-capitalist path of development for their countries are being subjected to gross attacks by Chinese propaganda. All these parties are revolutionary-democratic: the Arab Socialist Union in the U.A.R., the National Liberation Front in Algeria, the Arab Socialist Regeneration Party in Syria, the Democratic Party of Guinea, the National Revolutionary Movement in the Brazzaville Congo, the Burmese Way to Socialist Programme, and the Tanganyika African National Union in Tanzania. Though not at present Communist, these parties are socialist-oriented. They regard the non-capitalist path as a form of progressive development in the course of which there appear prerequisites for raising the question of building a socialist society under the leadership of the working class in the future.

What made scientific socialism different from all primitive forms of socialism, Lenin said, was

¹ See *For Unity in the International Communist Movement. Documents and Materials*, p. 197.

that it did not bind the revolutionary movement to any particular form of struggle. Scientific socialism does not invent any forms of struggle but takes them from life. "Under no circumstances," he wrote, "does Marxism confine itself to the forms of struggle possible and in existence at the given moment only, recognising as it does that new forms of struggle, unknown to the participants of the given period, *inevitably* arise as the given social situation changes."¹

The Maoists' approach to the forms and methods of the national liberation movement has nothing in common with this exceptionally important proposition of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory. Absolutising the forms and methods of the Chinese revolution and trying in every way to force them upon the revolutionary forces of other countries, the Maoists hinder them in their efforts to determine their own forms, means and methods of struggle, their own path of development.

It is obvious that Mao Tse-tung's and his followers' basic theoretic propositions relating to the national liberation movement are directed towards splitting it. One can talk all one wants about unity and solidarity but if one is guided by such views in practical activity, there can be only one ultimate result: division.

The developments of the past ten years fully corroborate such a conclusion.

Chapter II

MAOISTS' SPLITTING ACTIVITIES IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

The Sino-Indian Conflict and Its Consequences

For a number of years the People's Republic of China stood for the unity of action of the world socialist system, the national liberation movement and the working class of the developed capitalist countries, and this won it the trust of the revolutionary forces the world over. It was so during the Korean war in 1950-53 and during the Suez crisis in 1956. It was with concern for the unity and solidarity of the main contingents of the world revolutionary process that the Soviet-Chinese declaration, signed in Moscow on January 18, 1957, was imbued. And it was by appeals for the unity of the anti-imperialist forces that Chou En-lai's tour of eleven Asian and European countries at the end of 1956 and the beginning of 1957 was accompanied.

The communiqué on the Soviet-Chinese talks in the summer of 1958 on the developments in the Middle East stressed that the unity of these forces was indispensable for the successful struggle against imperialism. "If the imperialist war maniacs should dare to impose war on the peoples of the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. II, p. 213.

world," it said, "all the countries and peoples who love peace and freedom will unite closely to wipe out clean the imperialist aggressors and so establish an eternal world peace."¹ This determination on the part of the anti-imperialist forces had its effect: the imperialists then chose not to risk expanding their aggression against the national liberation movement in the Arab world.

A big role in rallying all the anti-imperialist forces of Asia, Africa and Latin America was played by Pancha Shila (Hindi for "Five Principles"). They were proclaimed in the preamble to the Sino-Indian agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India, signed for eight years in Peking on April 29, 1954. The two Asian powers pledged to abide by the following principles in their relations:

1. Mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. Non-aggression.
3. Non-interference in each other's affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful coexistence.

These principles attracted the attention of the peoples of Asia and other continents, for they promised to become a mighty weapon for uniting those who opposed colonialism and imperialist aggression in any form. Although the colonialists' notorious "divide and rule" policy, the policy of setting nations against one another, no longer succeeded so well, it had not suffered complete defeat. The thing was to deal it a shattering blow. And for that it was necessary consistently to strengthen the ties of friendship between the world socialist system and the forces of the national liberation move-

¹ *On the Current International Situation*, Peking, 1958, p. 5.

ment, among all the countries that had freed themselves from the colonial yoke.

That this task was feasible was proved by the Bandung Conference, April 18-24, 1955. Among the 29 states participating in it were India, the People's Republic of China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Japan, Cambodia, Laos, Egypt and Syria. It was the first time that Afro-Asian statesmen met at a round table to discuss the problems confronting them and urgent world issues.

Having failed to prevent the convocation of the conference, the colonial powers hoped that the Philippines, Thailand and certain other countries would hamper the adoption of major decisions. Their hopes were in vain. The Bandung Conference approved a number of documents reflecting the increasing role the Afro-Asian nations were playing in world affairs. Among the prominent decisions it adopted was the section entitled "Problems of Dependent Peoples". The conference, it said, was agreed: a) in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations was an evil which should speedily be brought to an end; b) in affirming that the subjection of people to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial of fundamental human rights and was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and was an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation; c) in declaring its support of the cause of freedom and independence for all such peoples, and d) in calling upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and independence to such peoples.

The representatives of the 29 Afro-Asian countries concretised the Five Principles and worked out on their basis the following ten Bandung Conference principles:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and

for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.

3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small.

4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.

5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.

(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries.

7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiations, conciliation, arbitration, etc.

9. Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation.

10. Respect for justice and international obligations.

Bandung was expressive of that highly important fact that the Afro-Asian nations, having broken out of colonial bondage, were taking an active part in the determination not only of their own destinies but of those of the world. Lenin had foreseen that such a time would come, and it did. The Afro-Asian countries set up their own front in world politics. It is characteristic and highly noteworthy that, together with the socialist countries, they have constituted a gigantic peace zone. "*The joining of the efforts of the newly-free peoples and of the peoples of the socialist countries in the struggle against the war danger is a cardinal factor of world*

peace," says the CPSU Programme. "This mighty front, which expresses the will and strength of two-thirds of mankind, can force the imperialist aggressors to retreat."¹

Especially important is the fact that it was the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and India that began to play an active role in this community. It is well known that Lenin, bearing in mind the vast potentialities of these nations, arrived at the important conclusion that the outcome of the world struggle ultimately depended on the fact that Russia, India and China accounted for the bulk of the world's population. "And during the past few years it is this majority," he wrote, "that has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity."²

Having achieved national independence, India showed a great desire to establish good-neighbourly relations with both China and the Soviet Union.

The dreams of the best people of India and China of a friendship between their countries on a new and more stable basis appeared to be coming true. They were well expressed by Jawaharlal Nehru in *The Discovery of India*: "... India and China look towards each other and past memories crowd in their minds; again pilgrims of a new kind cross or fly over the mountains that separate them, bringing their messages of cheer and good-will and creating fresh bonds of friendship."³

In that same book the leader of new India spoke of his sympathies towards the Soviet Union "I had no doubt," he wrote, "that the Soviet Revolution had advanced human society by a great leap and

¹ Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1961, p. 41.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 500.

³ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Calcutta, 1946, p. 227.

had lit a bright flame which could not be smothered."¹

After the disintegration of the British Empire, the Indian people rejected the numerous attempts made by the imperialists to involve their country in aggressive blocs. Nehru's Government had time and again refuted the provocative claims that India was threatened by communist menace from without. This stand naturally did not suit the imperialist elements in the West. It was not for nothing that the *New York World-Telegram and Sun* wrote on January 4, 1955, that Nehru was the man whose ruin was desired most in the West.

Sino-Indian and Soviet-Indian relations began to develop rapidly on the basis of Pancha Shila. This was vastly facilitated by the elimination in the world communist movement of the sectarian and dogmatic attitude to the national bourgeoisie in the Eastern countries and the restoration of the Leninist approach to the different aspects of life in the East and the developments bound with the participation of the national bourgeoisie in the common anti-imperialist struggle. In 1955 the Soviet Communist Party and Government repudiated the nihilistic characterisation in Soviet literature of the outstanding Indian national liberation movement leader Mahatma Gandhi.

There could of course be no exchange of friendly visits between the Indian and Soviet leaders so long as Gandhi's followers were treated as "imperialist agents". The same applied to Soviet-Burmese and Soviet-Indonesian relations. The Soviet leaders' visits to India, Burma and Afghanistan in 1955 and Nehru's, U Nu's and Sukarno's visits to Moscow showed that the Soviet Union's relations with these countries could really become friendly.

In those days, *Jenminjhpao* (of December 16,

¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 17.

1955) wrote: "Close unity of such countries as the U.S.S.R., India and China, which account for half the world's population, with the other peace-loving Asian nations will allow the peoples of Asia to hold their destinies firmly in their own hands."

For a number of years the Pancha Shila policy yielded fruit to all the anti-imperialist forces. It would have been in their interest further to strengthen the militant alliance between the socialist countries and the emergent national states. There was every possibility for them to settle any dispute, including territorial, by means of negotiations, on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference and territorial integrity. Such a prospect, however, did not accord with the Great-Power foreign policy of the Chinese Government. And so the blow dealt by the Chinese leaders to the Pancha Shila principles at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s was not fortuitous.

In 1959, after quashing a reactionary rebellion in Tibet, Chinese troops began to advance towards the Indian frontier. Although there had never been complete agreement between the two countries about their common frontiers and disputes did flare up from time to time over the centuries, there had never been any armed conflicts. The Chinese and Indian maps had different demarcation lines. The so-called McMahon Line—the frontier between India and the southern part of Tibet drawn up on the eve of the First World War—had always been objected to by China. But, as we have said above, things had never reached the fighting stage.

Now, in 1959, the Chinese forces moving to the frontiers delineated in the Chinese maps began to clash with the Indian troops on the line marked in the Indian maps as frontier. The Soviet Union voiced regret with the conflict through TASS on September 9 and in the government statement at

the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet session on October 30 of that year. It also expressed the hope that China and India would not allow international reaction to make capital out of their border incident and would settle the dispute in the spirit of their traditional friendship.

The dispute, however, grew with each passing month and year. In the autumn of 1962 the Chinese leaders took advantage of the Caribbean crisis to settle the border conflict with India by force and launched large-scale operations. On September 8, 1962, Chinese troops crossed the McMahon Line. On October 22, the Indian armed forces launched a counter-offensive. Large units were thrown into battle and thousands of Chinese and Indian troops were killed and wounded.

The fighting was taken advantage of by India's Right-wing parties and organisations which got Defence Minister Krishna Menon, one of the ardent champions of the unity of the anti-imperialist forces on the basis of Pancha Shila, dismissed from his post. The Right-wingers also demanded the resignation of the Nehru Government, renunciation of the neutralist policy, accession to SEATO and rapprochement with the imperialist powers. The Indian Communists were put in an extremely difficult position.

The armed conflict in the Himalayas evoked justified alarm in the countries which had adopted the historic Bandung Conference decisions together with China and India. At the very height of the fighting many Afro-Asian heads of state and government appealed to the belligerents to put an end to bloodshed and negotiate an agreement. The Chinese Government unilaterally decided on a cease-fire and the withdrawal of its troops to initial positions on December 1, 1962. But it would be a mistake to think that China did so in response to their call.

Judging by everything, no appeals to reason would have had any effect if the Caribbean crisis, fraught with the danger of a world thermonuclear war, had not been overcome. In their border dispute with India, the Maoists counted on this crisis, on its aggravation, and did everything to prolong it as much as possible. And when it was overcome after all, the Chinese Government was forced to back down in the Himalayas.

The champions of peace and international friendship welcomed the prospect of a peaceful settlement between India and China when the Chinese forces began to withdraw from some of the areas they had occupied. In December 1962 representatives of six Afro-Asian countries met in Colombo to work out proposals for a peaceful settlement. The task was successfully accomplished. After the conference in Colombo, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Ceylonese Prime Minister, visited Peking and Delhi for talks with the Chinese and Indian heads of government. With their consent, the Ceylonese Government published the following six-nation proposals on January 19, 1963: in the Western Sector (Kashmir area) China was to withdraw her military posts by 20 kilometres and this territory would be considered demilitarised; in the Eastern Sector (McMahon Line area) the line of actual control would serve as a cease-fire line; the Central Sector issue would be settled by peaceful means, without the use of force.

The Chinese and Indian governments agreed in principle with these proposals which were to be the basis of peace talks. Tribute should be paid the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who, during the parliamentary debate on the six-nation proposals, rebuffed the onslaught of the Right-wing parties which insisted on the renunciation of the non-alignment policy. On January 25, 1963, the Indian Parliament approved the policy of peaceful

coexistence, of the peaceful settlement of the frontier dispute with China.

The Chinese Government, on the other hand, did nothing except repeat on several occasions that "in principle" it accepted the Colombo Conference proposals. What is more, armed clashes flare up from time to time, though not on the scale of autumn 1962. The hotbed of tension in the Himalayas exists to this day. The traditional, centuries-old Sino-Indian friendship has so far not been restored. The ones preventing it are the Chinese leaders, the Indian reactionary parties and international imperialism.

The national liberation movement, the progressive forces of the newly-free Afro-Asian countries and their solidarity were dealt a heavy blow. A big service was thus done to the forces of imperialism and colonialism. By their splitting activities against India in 1959-62 and in subsequent years the Chinese leaders had discredited Pancha Shila more than the imperialist powers could ever have done. The Western press did not conceal its glee, particularly at the fact that all this would henceforth greatly complicate any joint action by the Asian countries against imperialism.

Rejoicing maliciously at the blood being shed in the Himalayas, the *New York Herald Tribune* wrote at the time that China was fighting India despite the fact that Prime Minister Nehru often stood up in defence of Peking before the whole world and Indian officials were still hinting that they were prepared to use all their influence to back China's efforts to obtain a seat in the United Nations. The paper said the newly-independent Asian states had closely followed the conflict and now could not but realise that neither communism nor neutralism could serve as a guarantee against war.¹

¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, October 22, 1962.

Chiang Kai-shek's statements were widely used to substantiate such arguments. Especially wide publicity was given to his statement of October 10, 1962, in which he said: "Events have proved that if a country seeks peace with the Chinese Communists, what it gets is aggression and war."¹ The head of the Taiwan clique made wide use in his statements of the pronouncements of the Indian leaders who said they had never expected China to launch military operations against India, for whom peace was a vital necessity.

Incidentally, in the autumn of 1962 Chiang Kai-shek was the only leader outside China who sided with Mao Tse-tung on the Indian frontier issue. The *New York Times* commented in this connection that in this conflict Mao Tse-tung was guided chiefly by nationalistic considerations and not by Marxist motives.²

All one can say is that in this particular case the influential American monopoly mouthpiece hit the nail right on the head in underscoring the incompatibility of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism in the approach to territorial issues.

After the frontier conflict with India China's patently chauvinistic line in territorial issues became the main element of her foreign policy. And it was consequently no accident that, having created a hotbed of tension in the Himalayas, the Government of the People's Republic of China set out to fan all the existing territorial disputes in Asia, notably the Indo-Pakistani conflict.

This conflict flared up immediately after the British colonialists had in 1947 divided their gigantic colony in Hindustan into two parts—India and Pakistan. Territorial disputes between the two new states became one of the main features of the

¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, October 21, 1962.

² *New York Times*, October 22, 1962.

international situation in the peninsula and not infrequently led to sanguinary clashes in the Kashmir area and other places. A major armed conflict broke out in the Rann of Cutch area in the summer of 1965. The two sides lost more than 8,000 officers and men in killed. The civilian population suffered severe material losses. The fighting threatened to drag out and that was fraught with enormous danger for the whole of Asia.

The U.N. Security Council's intervention brought about a ceasefire but the danger of resumption of hostilities remained. It was then that the Soviet Government offered its good offices to help the two countries settle their differences. India agreed. Her Government, headed since Jawaharlal Nehru's death in 1964 by Lal Bahadur Shastri, repeatedly reaffirmed its devotion to the Bandung spirit and sought to prove it by deeds. The Pakistani Government likewise accepted the good offices of the Soviet Union.

The meeting between Prime Minister Shastri and President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan was held in the presence of Premier Alexei Kosygin in Tashkent in January 1966. On January 10, the Indian and Pakistani leaders signed the Tashkent Declaration which restored normal peaceful relations between the two biggest states in South Asia. The progressive forces of the world welcomed the agreement. The Afro-Asian press stressed that the results of the meeting were not only important for the peoples of Hindustan but showed the other Afro-Asian countries the way to settle controversial issues peacefully.

And what was the stand of the People's Republic of China?

While the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and the progressive forces of Asia did everything to eliminate the dangerous hotbed of war, the Chinese leaders fanned its flames in every way.

When the Indian and Pakistani governments responded to the Security Council's appeal for a ceasefire and accepted Premier Kosygin's invitation to meet in Tashkent, China's policy-makers and propaganda went out of their way to discredit the good offices of the Soviet Union.

Commenting on this, the Calcutta *Amrita Bazar Patrika* wrote: "By taking the peaceful initiative which brought Pakistan and India together, the Russians proved by deed and not words that they were interested in preventing fighting from breaking out again.... The Soviet Union took this peaceful initiative in the face of open Chinese opposition which almost torpedoed the conference."¹

The Chinese leaders' splitting tactics during the Tashkent meeting showed once again how little Maoism cared for the vital interests of the new Asian states. China's policy-makers tried to get Pakistan to step up the operations and perpetuate the Indo-Pakistani conflict. But the Government of Pakistan had different ideas. At the opening of the meeting, President Ayub Khan said: "We have come here fully determined to co-operate. Our aim is to settle our differences with India and not to perpetuate them. We are not here to argue. We want to eliminate tension and help foster the feeling of confidence and tranquillity among the people of the two countries. I have no doubt that the esteemed Prime Minister of India and his esteemed colleagues are moved by the same feelings."²

Contrary to Peking's hopes, the Pakistani Government thus wished to put an end to the armed conflict. The Indian Government shared this desire. "An armed conflict," Lal Bahadur Shastri said, "creates more problems than it solves."³ At the

¹ *Za Rubezhom*, No 18, 1966, p. 10.

² *Pravda*, January 5, 1966.

³ *Ibid.*

same time the two leaders did not conceal the fact that many serious obstacles would have to be overcome before a settlement was reached.

The obstacles and difficulties remain to this day. But it was not long after the signing of the Tashkent Declaration that India and Pakistan resumed diplomatic relations, withdrew their troops to the positions held before August 1965 and exchanged prisoners of war, reached agreement on the reduction of the number of troops in the frontier areas, etc. Later there were meetings between their top military commanders and negotiations on certain economic problems. All this makes one hopeful that the obstacles and difficulties will be eliminated and that India and Pakistan will build up good-neighbourly relations. That is at any rate the wish of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government. But such a prospect does not please Mao Tse-tung and his group.

Splitting Activity in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement

It is conceded by many statesmen and politicians in Asia and other continents that the Chinese leaders have dealt a severe blow to the policy of non-alignment, which is one of the pillars of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. One cannot but agree with that. The blow was indeed dealt it, and first and foremost by China's actions against India. Pessimism about the effectiveness of this policy became widespread in India and other countries. Many began to think that their countries' security interests would be better served if they joined military blocs, say SEATO or CENTO. The pro-imperialist forces in India and other neutralist countries began openly to play up the notorious colonialist thesis that the newly-independent states could progress only if they co-operated with the former metropoli-

tan countries and not merely economically but militarily and politically.

The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party exerted no little effort to discredit the policy of non-alignment both by military and propaganda means. They concentrated particularly on discrediting Nehru, one of the sponsors and ideologists of this policy. On May 6, 1959, the newspaper *Jen-min jih pao* wrote in an editorial entitled "The Revolution in Tibet and the Philosophy of Nehru": "Mr. Nehru is the Prime Minister of India, the friendly neighbouring country we esteem, and one of the world's authoritative political personalities. For us, and we especially cannot forget it, he is a friend of China and an opponent of the imperialist policy of war and aggression."

Shortly after the outbreak of the border conflict, however, the Chinese leaders began to speak differently of the Indian Prime Minister and his foreign policy. The Maoists' chauvinist stand on territorial issues was responsible for their extremely hostile attitude to the Indian champions of the policy of non-alignment because they were involved in the conflict with the People's Republic of China. There was only one way they qualified this policy and that was "pro-imperialist". The Chinese propagandists, theoreticians and diplomats thus slandered India's foreign policy in 1961, when her people finally liberated Goa, Daman and Diu, the last Portuguese colonies on their soil. In the heat of their attacks on the Indian "agents of American imperialism", the Chinese leaders "failed to see" this important development in the history of the collapse of the system of colonial oppression. And that when the abolition of these colonies, effected, moreover, by military means, was fully in conformity with the principles of political non-alignment.

Incidentally, the Indian Government had tried for years to get Portugal to return these old Indian

lands, and all in vain. Backed by the United States, the Portuguese colonialists refused to do so. On December 2, 1955, the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the Portuguese Foreign Minister Paulo A. V. Cunha issued a joint statement which qualified Goa, Daman and Diu as "Portuguese provinces" and not as colonies. An attempt was thus made to take the issue off the agenda. But the Indian people refused to reconcile themselves to the existence on their soil of hotbeds of colonial plunder in the guise of "Portuguese provinces". And on December 18, 1961, they drove the colonialists out.

It is highly interesting that ten days before the liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu *Jenminjihpao* wrote that "in the last few years the foreign policy of India's ruling clique has been receiving increasing open support and praise from Washington". But it was precisely in those days that the U.S. Government came into conflict with Jawaharlal Nehru's Government, insisting on U.N. intervention in Indo-Portuguese relations. The Soviet Union, making use this time of its veto right in the Security Council, helped foil the Americans' attempt to condemn India and uphold the Portuguese colonialists.

In discrediting the policy of non-alignment, the Chinese theoreticians often cite the following statement by Mao Tse-tung: "Neutrality is merely a camouflage; a third road does not exist."¹ One could agree with this thesis with certain reservations if the policy of non-alignment were regarded as "sitting on the fence". But non-alignment or positive neutrality, as this policy was formerly called, has nothing in common with such a stand. This conclusion is borne out by the records of the

Summit conferences of the non-aligned countries, most of them Asian and African. There have been two such conferences.

A conference of non-aligned countries, in which an active part was played by Yugoslavia, was held in Belgrade in September 1961. The meaning of the policy of "positive neutrality", or "non-alignment", was thoroughly explained by many statesmen attending the conference. Jawaharlal Nehru, for instance, said:

"We call ourselves a conference of non-aligned countries. Now, the word non-aligned may be differently interpreted but basically it was used, and coined almost, with the meaning non-aligned with the great Power blocs of the world."¹ Nehru further stressed that the participants wanted to use all the influence they wielded to promote the cause of peace.

President Sukarno of Indonesia was even more categorical about non-alignment. "Let there be no confusion on that score," he said. "It is not the sanctimonious attitude of the man who holds himself aloof—'a plague on both your houses'. Non-aligned policy is not a policy of seeking for a neutral position in case of war; non-aligned policy is not a policy of neutrality without its own colour; being non-aligned does not mean becoming a buffer state between the two giant blocs. Non-alignment is active devotion to the lofty cause of independence, abiding peace, social justice, and the freedom to be free."²

The concoctions of the Chinese opponents of the policy of non-alignment were in practice repudiated by the second Summit conference of non-aligned states too. It was held in Cairo in October 1964

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, Peking, 1953, p. 9.

¹ *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries*, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961, p. 108.

² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

despite the Chinese Government's attempts to prevent it and was attended by representatives of 58 countries. That this conference was militantly anti-imperialist from the very start was evidenced by the fact that Tshombe, who was for a time Premier of the Leopoldville Congo, was debarred from it. Here is what the Cairo weekly *Akhbar al-Yom* wrote about it: "The Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries has condemned Moise Tshombe, Premier of the Leopoldville Congo, to political death.... Moise Tshombe's greatest mistake is that he thought people would with time forget his criminal treachery and perfidy towards the national hero Patrice Lumumba, his compact with foreigners against the independence of his country."¹

The anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist nature of the policy of non-alignment was reaffirmed by the declaration adopted by the Summit conference. True, some representatives of the Afro-Asian countries sought to deprive this policy of its anti-imperialist content. The conference, however, rebuffed their attempts, and this found expression in the declaration.

This document recognises the legitimacy of national liberation wars. "The process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible," it says. "Colonised peoples may legitimately resort to arms to secure the full exercise of their right to self-determination and independence if the colonial powers persist in opposing their natural aspirations."² In the course of the discussion of the national liberation movements, many of the participating statesmen rejected the alternative proposed by the Chinese Communist Party leaders: either a struggle for national liberation or a struggle for peace. The Cairo dec-

laration stressed that there was an organic link between the struggle for peaceful coexistence and the struggle for social progress. Further, the conference criticised the Chinese allegation that peaceful coexistence in Soviet-American relations extended to ideology.

The Chinese diplomats and propagandists put in no little effort to make it difficult for the conference to adopt decisions, sow suspicion and distrust towards some of the countries represented in Cairo, and discredit the aims which the participants sought to achieve. On October 9, for instance, the Hsinhua News Agency published an article entitled "India's Dual Alliance in the Guise of Non-Alignment", in which it grossly assailed both the neutralist foreign policy and the efforts of the Colombo Conference countries to help settle the Indian-Chinese frontier conflict diplomatically, and the Soviet-Indian relations. But the attempts to torpedo the conference failed. It ended in an atmosphere of co-operation despite certain differences of opinion about peaceful coexistence, the Moscow Treaty of 1963, etc.

The Belgrade and Cairo conferences thus proved convincingly that the champions of positive neutrality, or non-alignment, were not "sitting on the fence" in the bitter struggle raging against the aggressive forces which are nurtured and inspired chiefly by U.S. imperialism. Of course, if one is guided by the celebrated but abortive formula that "he who is not with us is against us", one must regard the countries that have freed themselves from colonial bondage but have not become members of the world socialist community as a "reserve of imperialism". But the world communist movement, overcoming this mistaken point of view in its theory and practice, is not guided by it in its appraisal of the role the new national states play in international affairs. Profound respect for them is

¹ *Pravda*, October 12, 1964.

² *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1965, p. 95.

one of the most important elements of the general line of the communist movement worked out at the Moscow conferences of 1957 and 1960 with the participation of the Chinese Communist Party.

It is also necessary in this connection to mention such an important field of activity of the non-aligned Afro-Asian countries as the United Nations. When this world organisation was established in 1945, there were only eleven Afro-Asian countries among its Charter members. In 1967 it already had 66 Afro-Asian members (out of a total of 122), and they have their representatives in the U.N. bodies.

Since the adoption of major decisions in the General Assembly requires a two-thirds majority, the Afro-Asian countries play a decisive role in it. The absolute majority of them are non-aligned and by no means "sit on the fence". It was they who played the decisive role in the adoption by the Fifteenth General Assembly on December 16, 1960, of the declaration on the total abolition of colonial regimes which had been drawn up on the basis of Soviet proposals. On November 27, 1961, the Sixteenth General Assembly adopted a resolution tabled by 38 Afro-Asian countries on the implementation of this historic declaration. On November 24, 1961, the General Assembly adopted the Afro-Asian draft resolution which declared Africa a nuclear-free zone. Such decisions are increasing from year to year.

Recognition of the important part played in the U.N. by the Afro-Asian countries found expression in the decision adopted in 1961 to elect a representative of Asia or Africa to the post of Secretary-General. Since then this post has been held by U Thant, Burma's former permanent representative. His activities during the Cuban events in the autumn of 1962 and other international crises were

highly appreciated by the Soviet Union and democratic public opinion the world over.

U Thant is a champion of non-alignment. Like many other representatives of the big group of Afro-Asian U.N. members, he has made prevention of nuclear war his main task. Today, when the international situation is extremely tense, the Afro-Asian diplomats spare no effort to create conditions for a compromise between the great powers that would not be detrimental to their prestige. There is nothing fortuitous in the fact that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries as a rule vote together with many Afro-Asian countries on important U.N. resolutions on peace and security.

Chinese diplomats have done no little to foster a sceptical and even hostile attitude towards the United Nations among the Afro-Asian states. Their efforts, however, have been unsuccessful. At the beginning of 1965 the Chinese Government adventuristically proposed the establishment of a new, "revolutionary" U.N. and the only one to back it was the Indonesian Government. On March 1 of that year Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations allegedly in protest against the election of Malaysia to the Security Council. On September 28, 1966, however, she resumed her membership of the organisation. The absolute majority of the U.N. members reject Peking's appeals for the liquidation of the United Nations. Where the destiny of this organisation is concerned, they all agree that it should be strengthened in every way and not destroyed.

This point of view is shared by the Soviet Union too. "The admittance of many newly-free countries to U.N. membership," the Central Committee report to the 23rd CPSU Congress said, "has substantially changed the situation in that organisation, and the change has not been in favour of the imperialists. In the U.N. the Soviet Union undeviatingly strives to

facilitate the unity of countries opposing aggression and thereby enhance the role played by the U.N. in the struggle for universal peace and the independence of the peoples."¹

The Maoists, understandably, cannot indulge in their splitting activities at the forums of the non-aligned states or in the United Nations. To further their aims, they make use of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation, which was set up at the First Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, held in Cairo in December 1957-January 1958 with the participation of representatives of 45 countries. Unlike the Bandung Conference, the Cairo Conference was non-governmental. It was an international forum of representatives of public organisations, including those of five socialist countries—the Soviet Union, China, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Mongolia. The Cairo Conference decided to set up a permanent Afro-Asian solidarity organisation and the activities of its national committees are co-ordinated by the Permanent Secretariat located in Cairo.

The Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, with 55 countries taking part, was held in Conakry, the capital of Guinea, in 1960. It approved the Charter which states, among other things, that the heads of delegations to the conferences constitute the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council. The first two conferences passed on the whole in a friendly atmosphere. Their participants were unanimous in their appraisal of the international situation and of the Afro-Asian nations' tasks in the joint struggle of the peoples of the world against the imperialist aggressors and for peace and international security.

In 1962, however, the situation in the Organisation changed sharply. Since then the Chinese rep-

resentatives, guided by Mao Tse-tung's hegemonic principles, have been trying increasingly to impose their adventurist dogmas upon the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. Particular efforts are made to isolate the Third World from the world socialist system and to discredit the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, particularly its stand during the Caribbean crisis in 1962.

This Peking policy made itself perfectly manifest at the Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, which was held at Moshi (Tanzania) in February 1963 and was attended by representatives of sixty countries. The agenda included important issues relating to the struggle against colonialism and the menace of thermonuclear war and for closer unity of the progressive forces of all the countries of these two great continents. During the discussions, the Chinese delegates tried to whip up nationalistic and racist prejudices, oppose the policy of peaceful coexistence to the anti-imperialist struggle, and denigrate the Soviet Union's efforts to prevent a world thermonuclear war.

In a talk with Soviet representatives at Moshi, Chinese chief delegate Liu Ning-yi said: "The countries of Eastern Europe should not interfere in the affairs of Asia and Africa.... We are sorry you have come here, you are not wanted here, it is an insult to the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. Whatever you choose to do, we shall be against you."¹ This ultimatum, as it were, naturally did not extend only to the Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. It was a tersely expressed credo of the Chinese Communist Party leadership on the relations between the socialist countries and the solidarity movement in the Third World.

It must be said that the splitting activities of the Chinese delegates did not create any serious com-

¹ 23rd Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1966, p. 54.

¹ *Pravda*, July 25, 1964.

plications at Moshi. The conference unanimously adopted a political resolution, a general declaration, a resolution on economic problems and a number of other documents. They all reaffirmed devotion to the spirit of Bandung. The general declaration said inter alia: "We support the Bandung principles and urge Afro-Asian countries which have boundary differences to solve these issues through peaceful negotiations inspired by these principles."¹

The atmosphere was more tense at the session of the Executive Committee of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation in Nicosia (Cyprus) in September 1963. The Chinese delegation brought heaps of Maoist publications as well as a number of Peking-based "African leaders", that is, people who have lived for years in China and are not recognised in Africa. One of these delegates was asked to leave the session.

The Chinese representatives trained their guns on the partial nuclear ban treaty of August 5, 1963. Chu Tsi-chi, head of the delegation, subjected this historic document to usual Peking-style slander by calling it a Soviet-American "plot" against the People's Republic of China.

Many of the speakers indignantly said that in calling the Moscow treaty a "betrayal", the Chinese were insulting the more than 80 countries who had by then signed it.

The Chinese delegates failed to split the session and only found themselves isolated. The session adopted a general declaration and twenty resolutions on different issues. And one of the most important resolutions was that on the prohibition of nuclear tests, in which the Executive Committee expressed gratitude to the countries which had signed the Moscow treaty.

¹ *The Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference*, Cairo, p. 63.

The best answer to the Maoists' slanderous allegations of the Soviet Union's "treachery" were the speeches of many Afro-Asian delegates. Antonio Miguel Bahia of Angola, for instance, said: "The Soviet Union has always effectively assisted and assists the peoples' national liberation movement. One cannot expect anything else from a country like the Soviet Union."¹

By the end of 1963 the Chinese Government discovered that its position in the Third World had badly deteriorated, particularly because the Sino-Indian border conflict remained unsettled. Anxiety became all the greater when China refused to sign the treaty on the partial ban of nuclear tests. The Chinese leaders' adventurist stand on the issues of war, peace and peaceful coexistence, outlined in the "Twenty-Five Points" of June 14, 1963, alarmed many Afro-Asian statesmen. The speeches of Chinese delegates at the forums of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation left no doubt that this stand had become the basic principle of China's foreign policy.

To dissipate these fears and alarm, the Chinese Government decided to send Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi on an Afro-Asian tour. The stress was chiefly on visits to African countries. Besides all else, it was necessary to win their support for the proposal to convene a second Afro-Asian conference on the lines of the Bandung Conference. And that was not easy, considering that China had by then established diplomatic relations with only eleven African states.

Chou En-lai embarked on his mission on December 14, 1963, and visited ten African countries, three Asian and one European (Albania). In the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Morocco, the Sudan, Mali and other countries, the Chinese

¹ *Pravda*, September 11, 1963.

Premier was very cautious in speaking his mind about world affairs. According to the *New York Times* (December 22, 1963), he chose to soft-pedal in his talks with the heads of state and government and at press conferences. His statements differed radically from the crude speeches of the Peking representatives in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation and the theorists and propagandists from *Jenminjhpao*. They were very much different too from his subsequent speeches, especially during the "proletarian cultural revolution".

The Chinese Premier, for instance, was well aware that there were not many in the African countries who cared to listen to slanderous allegations about the Soviet foreign and home policies and so he displayed utmost caution in referring to the nature of the differences with the CPSU. At his press conference in Cairo on December 20, he admitted that there were ideological differences between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties but said they would be overcome. And further: "Those who would take advantage of these differences should know that the two socialist powers are members of the socialist camp and that, in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance concluded by the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China in February 1950, their relations are those of allies...." That was well said of course. In actual fact, however, the attitude of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China towards the C.P.S.U. and the U.S.S.R. was already highly inimical, and this perturbed many countries of the Third World. That is why Chou En-lai carefully chose his words when speaking of the Soviet Union.

In the U.A.R. he visited Aswan. Foreign political observers wondered how he would react to the building of the High Aswan Dam. "Those who

followed his sightseeing tour of Egypt from Port Said and Cairo to Aswan reported him to be on his best behaviour," the *New York Times* wrote. "At Aswan he praised the high dam the Soviet Union is building as a 'tremendous effort and achievement'."¹ In this given case too Chou En-lai was forced to bear in mind the friendly relations between the U.A.R. and the U.S.S.R. Nor was there anything accidental in the fact that in the Sino-U.A.R. communiqué of December 21, 1963, and in the joint communiqués he signed in other countries, no mention was made of the Chinese-Soviet differences. This meant that the Chinese Premier failed to win over the leaders of the countries he visited to his country's side on that score.

Chou En-lai repeatedly laid stress in his speeches on the policy of "relying on one's own resources". But in propagating this concept, he was forced to avoid making open, flagrantly anti-Soviet attacks. At his press conference in Algiers on December 26 he was asked, for instance, how the Afro-Asian countries could best rid themselves of the vestiges of colonialism. "The best way," he replied, "is for each country to rely on its own resources." This was followed by a very serious reservation: "This, however, does not make co-operation and solidarity any less important." In this given case there was thus no direct contraposition of "reliance on one's own resources" to international co-operation that the Chinese propaganda usually indulges in.

Here too the Chinese Premier bore in mind African public opinion which highly appreciates the support of the socialist states. At the same time, when talk turned to China's economic development after 1949, Chou En-lai tried to describe in detail the establishment of the metallurgical, oil, chemical, aircraft and engineering industries, all of which she

¹ *The New York Times*, December 22, 1963.

had none before the victory of the revolution. But he did not mention once such an important factor as assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

However this experienced diplomat manoeuvred and soft-pedalled, he could not conceal the real aims he pursued on his tour by falsifying or hushing up well-known historical facts.

The Chinese Premier tried in vain to persuade African public opinion that the Chinese Government's intentions were peaceful. While Chinese propaganda was daily harping on a very different thing, Chou En-lai sought to convince the African countries that Mao Tse-tung was heart and soul for peaceful coexistence and doing everything to prevent a thermonuclear war. Nor did he succeed in allaying the grave fears engendered in the Afro-Asian countries by China's preparations for nuclear bomb tests. Wherever they went, the Chinese statesmen heard reproaches that China's border conflict with India remained unsettled.

In an interview granted to the Cairo correspondent of the MEN Agency on December 20, 1963, Chou En-lai thanked the governments of the six countries which had taken part in the Colombo Conference for their efforts to help normalise Sino-Indian relations. But this gratitude was so utterly false that nobody believed it. On December 12, that is, on the eve of the arrival of the Chinese delegation in the U.A.R. capital, the Cairo *Al-Goumhouria* wrote: "Nothing has so embittered and pained the Afro-Asian peoples as the absolutely unjustified Chinese aggression against India. It has dealt a tremendous blow to Afro-Asian solidarity. For it has not only seriously impaired relations between the two great states but put all the Asian and African countries, all progressive forces in a very difficult position." It was indeed no easy and simple matter to counter such an argument, especially

since the Chinese Premier was reminded of it in virtually all the countries he visited.

In one way or another, the joint communiqués all contended that international disputes, including territorial and border, should be settled peacefully, without resort to force. The need was also stressed to bring an end to the Indian-Chinese frontier conflict by diplomatic means. Chou En-lai did not succeed in winning a single African state to China's side on this issue. It must be pointed out in this connection that public opinion in African and other countries was strongly impressed by the Soviet proposals of December 31, 1963, on the peaceful settlement of all territorial and frontier disputes. The Chinese leaders qualified them as "one more fraud". Nevertheless, this Soviet diplomatic initiative was highly appreciated everywhere.

Chou En-lai would have failed in his duty to the "great helmsman" had he not found a way to eulogise the Maoist conception of "revolutionary war" and the Chinese experience of armed struggle during his tour of African countries. It was not easy of course to carry on such propaganda while fulfilling an official diplomatic mission. But the Chinese Premier overcame these difficulties. According to the Tunisian journalist Simon Malet, who interviewed him, Chou En-lai shed light on this probably most important aim of his mission in an off-the-record talks with newsmen. In an article published in the Japanese *Yomiuri* on January 20, 1964, Malet thus formulated the Chinese Premier's intention: to prod the African states which had already achieved independence to liquidate the West's political and economic influence by means of nationalisation, revolutionisation and socialisation.¹

¹ Simon Malet's articles on Chou En-lai's African tour were published in this newspaper on January 20, 21, 22 and 23, 1964.

In his speeches and statements during the tour Chou En-lai argued that the favourable revolutionary situation which had taken shape in Africa made correct political guidance a matter of decisive importance. At the same time he gave preference to the African countries which had won national independence by armed force. He particularly singled out Algeria and Kenya as countries that had achieved genuine independence after years of guerrilla warfare. "We shall soon see a second, third, fourth and even seventh Algeria in Africa, Asia and Latin America," he said at a press conference in Algiers on December 26, 1963.

It is of course not difficult to see in all this an obvious method of absolutising the use of military means for the solution of all political problems. These are the means the Maoists have long been seeking to make the national liberation forces adopt both during the struggle for freedom and after it has been achieved. From the Chinese point of view, the newly-independent African states should have used military means to solve the economic and other problems confronting them after the abolition of colonial regimes.

Realising that intrusive appeals to other countries to guide themselves by the experience of the Chinese revolution, and especially by the Chinese experience of armed struggle, were evoking a reaction that was unfavourable to Peking, Chou En-lai from time to time desisted from them. Interviewed by French journalist Claude Cadar in Morocco at the end of December 1963, he said: "China is not necessarily a model for all the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. There are countries other than China that can serve them as models. China has some experience that could be used by other countries. That is all."

However much the head of the Chinese Government tried, he could not dissipate the fears aroused

in the countries of the Third World by Peking's hegemonic, Great-Power ambitions. It was perfectly clear that one of the main aims of the Chou En-lai mission to Africa at the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964 was to subordinate the Afro-Asian solidarity movement to the Chinese leaders or, failing that, to split it and subordinate some of its parts. It did not escape the attention of the political observers who closely followed every step of this Chinese leader that he strove to make use of nationalistic and racial prejudices to foster the Maoist interests. The *New York Journal-American* wrote on December 28, 1963, that Chou En-lai came to Africa to build up China's influence not only as a world power but also as a poor country that had long been exploited by the Western imperialists. At any rate, this monopoly mouthpiece added with unconcealed malice, in talking to the Africans about the egoistic white nations bent on neo-colonialist exploitation, China clearly included the Soviet Union among them.

Perhaps this is just a figment of imperialist propaganda that is making good use of the differences among socialist countries? No, it is not. The Chinese leaders themselves have put into the hands of the enemies of socialism adequate documentary proof of this stand of theirs. And however much such an experienced diplomat as Chou En-lai may have "soft-pedalled" during his mission to Africa, he could not conceal the racist nature of Maoism when the talk turned to relations between peoples of different continents.

After his 72-day tour of fourteen countries, Chou En-lai, mindful of the results of the trip, began to insist that China should follow a flexible foreign policy. Chinese representatives in international organisations, he demanded, should learn to adapt themselves to the existing conditions and display modesty. Mao Tse-tung, however, preferred open

splitting activities among the countries of the world socialist system and the Third World. And it is exactly in pursuance of this policy that the Maoists continued to act in the Afro-Asian solidarity movement.

The next venue of their activity was the Fourth Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in the little Ghanaian town of Winneba in May 1965. The Chinese delegates, implementing the splitting policy of their leaders, began by slandering the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Among other things, they once again cast slur on Soviet support of the national liberation wars in Africa. They were rebuked by Antonio Agostinho Neto, Chairman of the Angola Popular Liberation Movement. After describing the heroic fight put up by the Angolan guerillas against the Portuguese colonialists, he said:

"I must stress here the vital importance of the solidarity and assistance of the countries of the socialist camp, particularly the Soviet Union whose unconditional moral, political and material assistance to the embattled Angolan people is the main factor of our national liberation struggle. We are deeply moved by this expression of fraternal assistance and express our profound gratitude for it."

Many other public personalities addressing the conference at Winneba were of the same opinion. Despite Peking's splitting tactics, the conference adopted a special resolution saying that representatives of all socialist countries would henceforth be invited as observers to all Afro-Asian solidarity forums.

The Fourth Conference accepted the Cuban delegation's proposal to convene a representative conference of Asian, African and Latin American peoples. This decision was of enormous political importance, for it testified to determination to expand the international anti-imperialist front.

The tricontinental forum was scheduled for 1966. And so along with the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation there came into existence the Organisation of Afro-Asian and Latin American Solidarity.

At that time preparations were under way for an Afro-Asian Summit, the first after the Bandung Conference. The preparatory meeting held in Jakarta in April 1964 decided to convene it in Algeria in March 1965. Subsequently, it was postponed to May and then June 1965. These postponements were caused by the disorganising activities of the Chinese Government. At the Jakarta meeting its Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, opposed a proposal to invite the Soviet Union. The argument was that the Soviet Union was not an Asian country, although it accounts for about 40 per cent of the continent's territory.

The issue became so sharp that the Soviet Government made two statements, on May 5 and August 14, 1964. In the second it stressed that irrespective of how it would be decided, there was only one possible course for the U.S.S.R. and it followed it consistently. "This," the statement said, "is the course of rallying together and uniting all the progressive, freedom-loving forces of the world, irrespective of race, nationality and geographical location."¹ The position of the Chinese leaders in this particular instance too was utterly nationalistic. In their statement of May 30, 1964, they said unambiguously that the Chinese Government would oppose the Soviet Union's participation in the "Second Bandung", irrespective of the state of Sino-Soviet relations, that is, irrespective of whether they improved or deteriorated.

As the preparations for the forum went on, most of the countries intending to attend it were for inviting the Soviet Union. The conference, however,

¹ *Izvestia*, August 14, 1964.

was once again postponed. This time on account of the events in Algeria (June 19, 1965) which brought about a change in the government leadership. The Preparatory Committee postponed the conference from June 29 to November 5.

The Chinese Government made thorough preparations for the new meeting, hoping to use it to subordinate the Third World. In the summer of 1965 Chou En-lai and Chen Yi undertook another tour of Asian and African countries and exerted every effort to talk the many countries that wanted to see Soviet leaders taking part in the conference out of the idea. When it became obvious that its hopes were built on sand, Peking declared that it would not attend the conference. The official announcement to this effect was made on October 26 and the reason the Chinese Government gave was that the atmosphere was allegedly un conducive to the success of the conference.

At the end of October the Foreign Ministers of the 45 countries planning to attend the conference met in Algiers (without their Chinese colleague) and decided to postpone the Summit sine die. The only definite thing they agreed upon was that it would still be held in Algeria.

At this meeting, Algerian Foreign Minister Abdul Aziz Bouteflika said:

"One of the problems to which this conference has paid most attention is the delicate problem of extending the list of participants. I am sure that the consensus of opinion is that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should take part. This follows logically from our undoubted desire to promote the unity of the forces of progress, freedom and peace the world over. The resolution we have just adopted leaves our opponents no chances for speculation."¹

¹ *Izvestia*, November 2, 1965.

The failure to convene the "Second Bandung" was doubtless a serious blow to Afro-Asian solidarity. The Chinese splitters had done their job. The Lebanese newspaper *Al-Ahrrar* then commented that "the present policy of the People's Republic of China towards the Algiers conference plays into the hands of imperialist propaganda and is to the detriment of China herself and the interests of Afro-Asian solidarity". Indeed, the imperialists immediately launched a campaign to persuade world public opinion that Afro-Asian unity was dead. The Reuter correspondent in Algiers wrote in this connection that the postponement of the twice-deferred Afro-Asian Summit spelled an end to the Bandung conferences as an Afro-Asian institute.¹

Although the "Second Bandung" has not yet taken place, the spirit of Bandung prevails to this day in the numerous forms of solidarity among the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and between the peoples of these continents and the peoples of Europe. The First Afro-Asian and Latin American Solidarity Conference (it came to be known as the Tricontinental Conference) was held in Havana in January 1966. Attended by more than 500 delegates of 82 countries and over 100 observers from democratic organisations all over the world and the European socialist countries, it was the biggest-ever international forum of its kind.

The Maoists made use of the rostrum in Havana again to slander the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to preach Mao Tse-tung's splitting conceptions and to create new obstacles for the international anti-imperialist front. The Tricontinental Conference was nevertheless successful and testified to the growing solidarity of the revolu-

¹ *Za Rubezhom*, No. 45, 1965, p. 9.

tionary forces and notably of world socialism and the national liberation movement. The resolutions it adopted despite the Maoists' opposition tended further to strengthen this solidarity. The resolution on peaceful coexistence and the other decisions which the Soviet delegation had actively helped formulate once again exposed in the eyes of the revolutionary forces of the three continents the splitting character of the Maoists' slanderous accusation of the Soviet Union of "colluding" with U.S. imperialism.

Peaceful coexistence, the Havana Conference pointed out, "is related exclusively to the sphere of relations between states with different social and political systems". Peaceful coexistence does not preclude the people's right to accomplish a social revolution, it presupposes it.¹ The support given by progressive and democratic states to the peoples falling victim to aggression fully accords with the principles of peaceful coexistence. This is exactly how the Soviet Union has always interpreted the concept of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

The U.S. State Department and the governments of a number of Latin American countries raised a clamour about the Havana resolution on peaceful coexistence. They alleged that the Tricontinental decisions were a threat to international peace and security and urged interference in the domestic affairs of states. The U.N. representatives of eighteen Latin American countries sent a letter to this effect to the Security Council. The clamour, however, did not last long. And it was Soviet diplomacy again that foiled U.S. imperialism's attempts to discredit the tricontinental solidarity movement.

The Soviet representative in the United Nations sent the President of the Security Council a letter

¹ See *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1966, p. 4.

in which he convincingly proved that the accusations levelled against the Havana Conference pursued the definite aim of diverting the attention of the world from the numerous instances of U.S. diplomatic and armed interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. The participants in the Havana Conference merely made use of the inherent right of public organisations to voice their views on urgent present-day problems. This was a right no one could challenge, the letter said.¹

As for the peoples' right of revolution, it was not something invented by the Havana Conference. It is well known that it was proclaimed by bourgeois leaders in the days when capitalism was a historically progressive system and bourgeois revolutions were sweeping one country after another. It is also well known that the bourgeoisie proclaimed this right "unlawful" after it had established its power. Incidentally, there are instances when the imperialists, working out more flexible tactics in the sphere of foreign policy, suddenly remember this right. For instance, one of the 1961 issues of the *Department of State Bulletin* proclaimed Abraham Lincoln's celebrated pronouncement that "the right of revolution is a most sacred right"² well-nigh as a device of U.S. Latin America policy.

When the U.S. Government was drawing up the alliance for progress programme in 1961, it was not averse to passing itself for a continuer of the American people's revolutionary traditions. "We are proud of our revolutionary origin and traditions," said one of the documents of the State Department.³ And if the U.S. ruling element deem it sometimes necessary for tactical considerations to recall the country's revolutionary past, why can't

¹ See *Pravda*, February 25, 1966.

² *The Department of State Bulletin*, November 6, 1961, p. 740.

³ *The Department of State Bulletin*, July 17, 1961, p. 117.

the national liberation forces of the three continents speak of their truly sacred right?

The tricontinental solidarity movement is expanding, overcoming many serious difficulties in the process. These difficulties are created, on the one hand, by imperialism, and not only American, and by all sorts of adventurers, chiefly those in Peking, on the other. But the very first steps of this movement bespeak its vast potentialities. The anti-imperialist forces are coming to realise more and more how utterly important it is to rebuff the Maoists and their agents. This was illustrated by the session of the Council of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation in Nicosia in February 1967.

A demand to annul the decision to hold the next, fifth Afro-Asian solidarity conference in Peking was raised on the eve of this session by many national solidarity committees. This decision was adopted at the conference in Winneba. There were serious doubts voiced even then. Those who demanded the annulment of the decision rightly alluded to the splitting activities of the Chinese Communist Party leaders and particularly to the hungweiping orgies, saying that in these conditions the conference could not function normally. Foreseeing the unfavourable situation it would find itself in at the Nicosia session, the Chinese delegation boycotted it. In its statement of February 3, 1967, packed with the usual Maoist abuse at the "modern revisionists", the Chinese solidarity committee declared in advance that the decisions of this session would be "invalid".

Despite Peking's splitting activities, the Nicosia session was a success. It deemed it impossible to convene the fifth Afro-Asian solidarity conference in the Chinese capital and instructed the Permanent Secretariat to organise it in Algeria. The session, moreover, expelled from the Organisation several pro-Peking groups "representing" the national libe-

ration movement in a number of countries in which they have not lived for many years and, consequently, which they have no right to represent. The session helped further strengthen the unity of the anti-imperialist forces.

The Nicosia session adopted a special document on the fiftieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and felicitated the Soviet Union on the occasion of this jubilee on behalf of the peoples of Asia and Africa. The participants expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union, the country which exerts an enormous influence on the struggle for social progress the world over.¹

After the session in Nicosia the Maoists announced the establishment of a Chinese committee charged with the organisation of the fifth Afro-Asian solidarity conference in Peking. The struggle against the splitters is growing increasingly tense. It is being waged in all the international organisations where China has her representatives. In August 1966 the latter succeeded in seizing the leadership of the Afro-Asian journalists' association and at the same in splitting the Afro-Asian writers' organisation. A new "Afro-Asian Writers' Permanent Bureau" was set up in Peking, it was announced on August 17 of that year.

Although the splitting activities of the Maoists caused no little damage to the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, it remains a major factor of world politics. At the beginning of 1968 the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation united 75 national committees. A major event in its life in that year was the special conference in support of the Vietnamese people in September. It was held in Cairo and created conditions for the further development of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement.

¹ *New Times*, Moscow, No. 12, 1967, p. 39.

The "Proletarian Cultural Revolution"

The "proletarian cultural revolution" in China ushered in a new stage in the Maoists' subversion of the anti-imperialist forces. This stage is distinguished, first, by the intensification of their efforts to subordinate the anti-imperialist movements in Asia and Africa, and to achieve their ends they resorted to a new method which came to be known in many countries as "export of hungweipings". Secondly, it is characterised by unbridled anti-Sovieteering on a scale never known in the history of the international communist movement. To create at any price a world anti-imperialist front without the Soviet Union and to isolate the Soviet Union and other socialist countries from the Third World is well-nigh the main aim of Mao Tse-tung.

On September 1, 1966, *Jenminjhpao* published an article entitled "Destroy the Old World and Build a New One". Formally, the authors were the pupils of a Peking "school of militant hungweipings" but it was written naturally by people who had long grown out of school age. The article was a sort of Maoist credo on the "international significance" of hungweiping brigandage. "We hungweipings are not staging only a nation-wide rebellion," it said. "We are also ready to emerge into the international arena in order to fight to the end and stir up a universal rebellion together with all the oppressed countries and peoples of the world." It was this Maoist appeal which gave rise to the expression abroad of "export of hungweipings".

What it means is open interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, primarily in the Third World. The Maoists are not deterred from such operations by any international law rules. The Maoists are interfering in these countries with a view to "revolutionising" them and establishing in them the order that suits the "great helmsman". The

"proletarian cultural revolution" is being used as a weapon for subordinating other countries (no more and no less!). Wide use is made of Chinese nationals abroad, of whom there are especially many in Southeast Asia. According to official statistics cited in the *Japan Times* on November 4, 1962, there were then 146,000 Chinese living in the Philippines, 1,002,000 in South Vietnam, 576,000 in Cambodia, 4,000 in Laos, 4,150,000 in Thailand, 2,378,000 in Malaya, 1,167,000 in Singapore, 82,000 in North Borneo, 180,000 in Sarawak, 2,400,000 in Indonesia, 400,000 in Burma and 35,000 in India.

The Maoists' attempts to use people of Chinese nationality to establish their influence in the neighbouring countries evoked serious alarm there. However well they may camouflage their hegemonic ambitions, the facts show that the "Chinese peril" looms large over Asia. In these conditions, the development and consolidation of the international anti-imperialist front naturally meets with difficulties.

Although the Maoists constantly harp on proletarian policies and the proletarian revolution, they regard the Chinese capitalists in the Southeast Asian countries as their best friends.

It would be rather interesting to recall in this connection the statement on relations with China made by the Soviet Government in July 1919. "The Soviet Government," it said, "waives all special privileges and shuts all the trading stations operated by Russian merchants on Chinese soil. No Russian official, priest or missionary has any right to interfere in Chinese affairs, and if he commits a crime he should be tried according to law by a local court. There should be no authority or courts in China other than the authority and the courts of the Chinese people."¹

¹ *Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Vol. II, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, p. 222.

What a contrast between this truly proletarian policy and the present actions of the Chinese leaders who are intensely helping the Chinese bourgeoisie in the Southeast Asian countries, mumbling something about the "specific conditions" in which the revolution triumphed in China! It is noteworthy that many Chinese capitalists in Southeast Asia wholeheartedly back the Maoists' efforts to "export" the "proletarian cultural revolution" there—they know very well that there is nothing proletarian in it. They back every one of Peking's chauvinistic undertakings, no matter how ultra-revolutionary they may look.

These are the forces that provoked disorders in Burma in the summer of 1967. For several years now this country has been carrying out progressive reforms. The Revolutionary Council headed by General Ne Win, which came to power in 1962, issued on April 30 of that same year a declaration entitled "The Burmese Way to Socialism" which formulated the programme of the country's non-capitalist development. The tasks it enumerated were as follows: 1) to constitute a socialist democratic state, 2) to build up a planned socialist economy based on state and co-operative ownership, 3) to promote the alliance of peasants and other working masses, 4) to unite all the national groups, and 5) to continue with the policy of positive neutrality.

After its advent to power the Revolutionary Council nationalised all the leading branches of industry and first and foremost the enterprises belonging to foreign capitalists. The state took over the banks and established control over almost the whole of foreign trade, as well as the purchases and distribution of foodstuffs.

Having nationalised all large industrial enterprises, the Government prohibited the establishment of new private establishments.

It also banned foreign investments in the country's economy and took steps to complete the agrarian reform. Co-operatives are being set up and everything is being done to abolish the system of feudal landownership and put agricultural development on the path of mass co-operation.

The Ne Win Government is taking steps to put an end to the civil war which broke out in 1948. In 1963 it initiated talks with the Burmese Communist Party. They brought no result, although the Government hoped that the underground organisations would understand the revolutionary character of the socio-economic transformations undertaken in the country. But the Burmese Communists, who have long been under the influence of Maoism, blindly follow the "Chinese way" and are counting solely on armed struggle. They rejected all government proposals for co-operation in the implementation of progressive reforms.

The Maoists do not recognise the non-capitalist path of development under the leadership of revolutionary-democratic parties, and the Burmese Socialist Programme Party is one of them. How the problem of relations between the underground organisations (according to government figures, they had about 10,000 members in 1963) and the Burmese Socialist Programme Party will be solved is up to the Burmese themselves. But the Maoists are constantly interfering in Burma's affairs and intriguing against Ne Win's Government.

The situation exploded at the end of June 1967 when clashes occurred between the Chinese and the Burmese in Rangoon and other cities. The Peking leaders, it turned out, had instructed the Chinese living in Burma and other countries to establish hungweiping organisations and "raise high the banner of the proletarian cultural revolution". Among the instigators of disorders were quite a few Chinese merchants and bankers who naturally had

been affected by the revolutionary-democratic reforms undertaken by the Ne Win Government. The organisers of the disorders received a fitting rebuff and in the course of the next three months or so the Chinese Government sent Burma more than twenty notes with "warnings" and all sorts of threats. In Peking, the hungweipings besieged the Burmese Embassy.

Similar events occurred in other countries too. The Maoists set out to flood the world with propaganda material. Things went so far that in September 1967 the Brunei authorities, for instance, found Mao's portraits in the tins of olives imported from China. This is all part and parcel of the notorious "export of hungweipings" programme.

Such things naturally evoke indignation. The Nepalese *Commoner* wrote wrathfully on July 13, 1967, that no one in Nepal wanted China to export her "cultural revolution" there. This little country, it said, did not want to appear unfriendly to anyone, particularly its neighbours. But it expected them to leave it alone and abstain from attempts to impose any "cultural revolution" upon it.

Peking continues with its blackmail in its efforts to implant Mao conceptions everywhere. As a result, Burundi, the Central African Republic and Tunisia have severed diplomatic relations with China and Kenya has expelled the Chinese diplomatic representative.

There are, however, two places that have nothing to fear from the "export of hungweipings". These are Hongkong and Macao, both of them located on Chinese soil.

The British colony of Hongkong (Hsiangang) has a population of about 4 million, and 98 per cent of them are Chinese. The colony is made up of two parts. One of them is the island of Hongkong and a small segment of the Kowloon Peninsula. Britain seized them from China in 1842. The other

part is the so-called New Territories, located on the Kowloon Peninsula and several coastal islands. Britain leased them from China for 99 years in 1898.

Curiously enough, the Chinese Government has never demanded the return of this colony which, together with the neighbouring Portuguese colony of Macao (Aomen), is one of the remnants of the demolished colonial system in Asia. In India, as we have said above, such colonies were abolished in 1961. The Chinese Government, however, not only does not ask the British to leave Hongkong but, on the contrary, does everything to prolong their stay there as long as possible. It may be paradoxical but it is a fact. Paradoxical because the Chinese leaders are constantly parading their "anti-imperialism" as an example the world revolutionary movement should follow.

In May 1967 the workers of Hongkong staged mass demonstrations and strikes to back their demands for better working conditions and higher wages. They also raised political demands. The struggle transcended the bounds of ordinary disputes between the workers and the employers and paralysed life in the colony. The Peking leaders at first tried to make these developments appear as an expression of "devotion to Chairman Mao". They sent the British Government numerous notes in which they "vigorously condemned" Hongkong police repressions against the workers. And, then, about half a year later, Chou En-lai told the workers to abstain from striking and abused those who would dare ignore his instructions. These obviously treacherous instructions were issued because the events in Hongkong had dealt a blow to the interests of the People's Republic of China.

As a matter of fact, Hongkong is indispensable to China as a British colony. She arranges a great many financial and trade deals with capitalist coun-

tries in this colony. And that brings the Chinese Treasury between \$400 million and \$600 million in foreign currency a year. A considerable part of it is the money remitted to China through Hongkong banks by the rich Chinese living abroad. Chinese trading organisations operate their own stores in Hongkong. Trains loaded with pork, vegetables, fruit, cattle and other goods freely cross from China into Hongkong and flood its market with these products.

Contacts with the Chinese import-export organisations in Hongkong are maintained by about fifty countries that have trade and diplomatic representatives there. The United States is one of them. In 1965, for instance, it sold about \$500 million worth of goods to Hongkong. A colony of 4 million naturally cannot absorb such an enormous sum. There are good reasons to believe that a substantial part of this sum is accounted for by deals between the United States and China, although officially there are no trade relations between them.

It is for this very same reason that the Chinese leaders are interested in Macao remaining a Portuguese colony. Its importance as a major port for the transshipment of Western goods to China increased considerably after India had driven the colonialists out of Goa, Daman and Diu. That is precisely why the Chinese Government avoids any serious conflicts with the Macao administration.

There was unrest in Macao at the end of 1966, touched off by the beating of a Chinese worker and a minor conflict between the population and the administration of the small island of Dangtsu. A number of Chinese were killed and wounded in the ensuing clashes. The Chinese Student Association in Macao demanded the punishment of the chief of the police, an end to reprisals and a guarantee against their recurrence. In these circumstances, the Chinese leaders deemed it necessary to react in

some way to the colonialists' actions. They lodged a "very sharp protest" and said the Chinese people resolutely backed the just actions of their patriotically-minded countrymen in Macao. On December 12 the Portuguese authorities accepted the Association's demands. This settled the dispute.

Judging by everything, the Chinese leaders do not intend to take any steps to liquidate the "Far Eastern Monte Carlo", as Macao has long been called. And yet the Peking theorists and propagandists never tire harping on their "firm and consistent" attitude towards all forms of colonialism. Many African countries have severed diplomatic relations with Portugal in protest against her brigand war in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. And Peking actually has an "entente cordiale" with the authorities in Macao, even if unofficially. Incidentally, for years there have been persistent rumours that Portugal intends to recognise the People's Republic of China. Lisbon has not denied them.

And so these two "colonies by the grace of Mao" continue to exist. They have latterly served not only as venues of financial and trade deals but also as holiday spots for the U.S. servicemen fighting the Vietnamese people. American warships bring officers and men to Hongkong and Macao to rest after heavy fighting on Vietnamese soil. U.S. Air Force planes flying to South Vietnam make use of the Hongkong aerodrome. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has issued a number of statements about it. As for the Mao Tse-tung group, all it does is lodge "very sharp protests" to which neither Britain nor the United States pays any attention. The imperialists know very well the price of Peking's ultra-revolutionism.

The Mao Tse-tung group does not cease to interfere in the Indonesian communist movement. The Maoists are persevering in their efforts to turn this

country into a proving ground for the application of the ideas of the "great helmsman". A few years ago this interference ended in a catastrophe for the Indonesian Communist Party. It was under the influence of Mao Tse-tung and his anti-Marxist conceptions that the leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party embarked upon the path of adventurism. In 1965 they encouraged and supported the putsch organised by a group of Indonesian officers which has come to be known as the "September 30 Movement".

In the view of its organisers, this "movement" was to "stimulate" the revolutionary process in Indonesia. The Communist Party leaders affirmed that the situation had become ripe for a revolution. That, for instance, was the thing which guided the May 1965 Plenary Meeting of the Party's Central Committee held to commemorate its 45th anniversary. This conclusion was not the result of a concrete analysis of the situation, as required by Marxism-Leninism, but the fruit of D. N. Aidit's consultations with Mao Tse-tung. The "great helmsman" time and again expressed the conviction that the situation was everywhere ripe for the revolution and that all the Communists had to do was to "make a revolution" but only in accordance with his thesis that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun".

In the early fifties, after a long and bitter inner-party struggle, the Indonesian Communist Party dealt a strong blow to the putschist trends in the Party and to the attempts of some of its leaders to force the Party to adopt armed struggle tactics and set up liberated areas along the Chinese lines. The Party then rejected the policy of mechanically emulating the experience of the Chinese revolution.

The Fifth Congress of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1954 adopted a new programme which envisaged patient, painstaking work among the

masses and consummation of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution which began in August 1945. The Congress devoted particular attention to the problem of resolutely combating all forms and manifestations of subjectivism in revolutionary activities. Speaking of the Congress decisions, Aidit stressed the utter importance for the Communists to concern themselves with the everyday needs of the workers, the peasants and the working intelligentsia. This, he stressed, "is the only way to strengthen the Party's links with the masses and prevent it from again becoming a prey to 'leftist' slogans".¹

But the leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party grossly violated the basic principles of the programme, adopted the Maoists' adventurist conceptions and became its victims. The September 30 Movement was quashed and a terror campaign on a scale unknown in Indonesia was unleashed against the Communist Party. Hundreds of thousands of Communists were murdered and the Party was banned. But even after such a catastrophe, the surviving advocates of the "Chinese way" continue to stake everything on pushing through the revolutionary process with armed force. Carrying out Peking's instructions, they have sought to fan the flames of guerilla warfare in various parts of the country, for instance, in the northwest of Kalimantan, where very many Chinese live, as well as in Java. These attempts have failed. But, ignoring the lessons of the September 30 Movement and grossly falsifying the developments in Indonesia after these tragic events, Peking propaganda continues to claim that the main Indonesian islands are being swept by the "people's war" and that "bases" are

¹ See D. N. Aidit, *The History of the Communist Party of Indonesia*, New Delhi, 1955, p. 45.

being set up everywhere. The Maoists are bent on concealing from the Chinese people the truth about the failure of "Mao's ideas" in Indonesia.

"Heavenly Music for U.S. Imperialism"

Every one of the Maoists' acts, whatever its concrete form, is inevitably attended by anti-Soviet outbursts. With the appearance of the hungweipings anti-Sovieteering became a permanent institute in Peking's foreign policy. This makes the Maoists' splitting activities highly dangerous for the anti-imperialist forces. The Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee (August 1966) urged "complete dissociation" from "modern revisionists". It declared that there could be no joint action with them, that "the struggle against imperialism presupposes a struggle against modern revisionism".

This meant that the Mao Tse-tung group was planning to intensify its splitting activities on an unprecedented scale, and that had a highly adverse effect on the Vietnamese people's struggle.

At the Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party the Maoists went so far as to say that the C.P.S.U.'s support of the Vietnamese people's struggle was "counter-revolutionary and deceitful" and that the assistance itself was "sham support and real treachery".¹

After this Plenary Meeting the anti-Soviet campaign in China assumed proportions of a scale never paralleled anywhere. Alleging that the Soviet Union was "colluding" with U.S. imperialism, the Mao Tse-tung group stooped to organising riots outside the Soviet Embassy in Peking. They went on for months. The monstrosity of anti-Soviet

hysteria was best illustrated by one of the posters then paraded by the hungweipings in Peking. "Soviet revisionists," it said, "we are waiting for the moment to get even with you. We shall skin you alive, slash your veins, burn your corpses and scatter your ashes." Here is what the Plenary Meeting of the Chilean Communist Party Central Committee said about this: "This is heavenly music for U.S. imperialism: such imprecations were in the past mouthed by Hitler and Goebbels."

In special decisions on the Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee the absolute majority of the Communist Parties said this Plenary Meeting had ushered in a new stage in the Chinese Communist Party's splitting activities in the international communist, working-class and national liberation movements. Especially dangerous was the mad idea nurtured by the "great helmsman" to "expel" the Soviet Union from the anti-imperialist front. The Maoists' splitting activities are chiefly directed towards achieving this aim. Their policy made it easier for U.S. imperialism to escalate its aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

"The military successes of the Vietnamese people," C.P.S.U. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev said, "could have been still more significant if not for the stand of Mao Tse-tung's group which hampers co-ordinated assistance to Vietnam from all socialist countries, including China."¹

The Maoist fables about "sham support and real treachery" cannot delude anyone. The Soviet Union not only condemns the United States' aggression against the D.R.V. but gives the Vietnamese people diplomatic and material assistance. This assistance was substantially increased after the wanton U.S.

¹ See *Pravda*, August 21, 1966.

¹ *Great October. Fifty Years of Great Achievements of Socialism*, p. 82.

air raids on Haiphong in early August 1964. In February 1965 Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Hanoi. As a result of his talks there agreement was reached on the strengthening of the defensive capacity and security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and on the holding of regular consultations in this sphere. The Soviet Government expressed readiness to grant further assistance and sent to the D.R.V. the materiel it needed.

The volume of Soviet deliveries to the D.R.V. was considerably increased after the April 1965 visit to Moscow of a D.R.V. delegation led by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Working People's Party of Vietnam. Moreover, the Soviet Government declared that, if asked by the D.R.V. Government, it would permit Soviet citizens wishing to fight for the Vietnamese people's just cause to go to Vietnam.

New agreements on additional Soviet technical assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and on further gratis economic aid were signed in Moscow in December 1965.

Particularly important was the Statement of the 23rd C.P.S.U. Congress Concerning U.S. Aggression in Vietnam, which was unanimously adopted on April 8, 1966. The Congress voiced conviction that the aggressors would meet with increasing support of Vietnam by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

In that same year the Soviet Union took an active part in the discussion of the Vietnamese question by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. On July 6 its Political Consultative Committee, meeting in Bucharest, adopted a special statement on this important question. The statement stressed that the Warsaw Treaty states:

"1. Most emphatically warn the U.S. Government of the responsibility it assumes before mankind, by continuing and extending this war, for all

the incalculable possible consequences, to the United States itself included;

"2. Will continue to render the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ever increasing moral and political support and all-round assistance needed victoriously to repulse American aggression, including economic help and assistance with defence means, materials, equipment and specialists, with due regard for the requirements of the new phase of the Vietnam war;

"3. Declare their readiness, should the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam request it, to allow volunteers from their countries to go to Vietnam to help the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the American aggressors."¹

The Political Bureau of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the Soviet Government fully approved the Soviet delegation's activity at the Bucharest conference of the Political Consultative Committee. They instructed the competent bodies to take all necessary steps envisaged by the statement on the Vietnamese question, including those relating to economic and military assistance, to help repulse American aggression against the fraternal people of Vietnam.

In pursuance of this decision, the Soviet Union signed a number of new agreements with the D.R.V. Especially important are the agreements of September 23, 1967, providing for the delivery to the D.R.V. in 1968 of planes, anti-aircraft missiles, artillery, small arms, ammunition and other materiel. They also envisaged the delivery of industrial plant, transport facilities, oil products and other goods necessary for the country's economic development. All this helped enhance the Democratic Republic's defence potential.

Speaking on the occasion of the fiftieth anniver-

¹ *New Times*, No. 29, Moscow, 1966, p. 40.

sary of the Great October Revolution, Le Duan said: "The assistance rendered by the Soviet Union, the other fraternal socialist countries, the Communist and Workers' Parties, all the peoples of the world, is a major factor of victory for the Vietnamese people."¹

It must be stressed that the support given by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression is of vast international significance. It is especially important for the peoples who have not yet won national independence and are fighting for it with arms in hand. Amilcar Cabral, General Secretary of the African Party of Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands has said in this connection: "We regard all assistance to Vietnam, and particularly that rendered her by the peoples of socialist countries led by the working people of the great Soviet Union, as important and direct support of our own struggle."²

Despite these well-known facts, the Maoists continue to clamour about the Soviet Union's "sham support" of the Vietnamese people. And what do they regard, one may ask, as "real support" of Vietnam? To believe Peking propaganda, the support would be "real" only if the Soviet Union declared war on the United States "for the sake of Vietnam", that is, if it unleashed what would practically amount to a world thermonuclear war. This thesis of the Peking strategists has long been repudiated by the absolute majority of the revolutionary forces the world over. Even those who had long been under the spell of Mao Tse-tung's ultra-bold slogans are beginning to see what they are really worth.

The Communist Parties have time and again

¹ *Pravda*, November 4, 1967.

² *Pravda*, October 16, 1968.

stressed the organic, inseparable link between the Soviet Union's support of the Vietnamese people and the struggle to prevent a world thermonuclear war. The Hungarian newspaper *Népszabadság* on May 1, 1966, described such a combination in politics as "genuine courage that has nothing in common with the actions of adventurers who brag and gamble with human destinies. What distinguishes real revolutionaries from them is that they understand their responsibility for the destinies of the peoples, scientifically analyse the situation, answer for their own actions, and combine their well-considered, sober decisions with energetic and bold actions".

The Maoists' splitting activities in the national liberation movement and the world socialist system please the ruling elements in the United States and other imperialist countries. The anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leaders on the question of Vietnam has objectively encouraged the U.S. Government to reappraise its policy towards the People's Republic of China. This highly hostile policy took shape as a result of the collapse of the Kuomintang regime which the U.S. imperialists helped enormously. After 1949 the American rulers swore time and again that they would never reconcile themselves to the existence of People's China. At the beginning of the 1960s, however, there appeared new nuances in the speeches of American Congressmen and diplomats.

The possibility of the United States reappraising its policy towards China was first discussed by the American ambassadors in Asia at their conference under Averell Harriman's chairmanship in Baguio (Philippines) in 1962. Although this question was discussed in general outline and no concrete proposals were advanced, the very fact that American diplomats dealt with it attracted attention everywhere. It was obvious to all that this new develop-

ment was the result of the Chinese leaders' increasingly strong attacks on the Soviet Union.

A more clearcut statement on the prospects of American-Chinese relations was made by Roger Hilsman, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Speaking in San Francisco on December 13, 1963, he said that, if one were to paraphrase a celebrated expression of the past, the United States was pursuing a policy of the "open door" towards the People's Republic of China. He stressed that the U.S. Government was determined to keep the door open because the developments "might advance our national good".

Commenting on Hilsman's speech, the *New York Times* wrote that "it did not change policy, but it changed Washington's posture".¹ The American press began daily to foster the idea that U.S. diplomacy should make full use of Chinese nationalism and anti-Sovietism in undertaking political manoeuvres with regard to China. There was clear discontent also voiced with American diplomacy's lack of flexibility and its clumsiness in carrying out such manoeuvres. Walter Lippmann once wrote that the Americans reminded him of one of those prehistoric animals consisting solely of shell and teeth but almost without any brains.

Subsequently, the question of relations with China was discussed in the U.S. Congress. The congressmen and specialists taking part in the debates invariably laid stress on the Maoists' splitting policy in relation to the Vietnamese question. This policy greatly facilitated the appearance of yet another aggressive U.S. doctrine—President Johnson's Pacific or Asian Doctrine.

The U.S. President outlined the basic aims of the U.S. Asian policy in an address to the American

Alumni Council on July 12, 1966.¹ He particularly stressed the idea that Asia, especially its southeastern part, was a U.S. sphere of influence. The United States, he further said, would go on using its military might to safeguard security and peace in Asia. At the same time he proclaimed economic measures showing that the U.S. Government was prepared to draw up and implement an Asian variant of the Marshall Plan.

Lastly, Johnson declared that the aim of the United States' policy in Asia was "reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies".² What he had chiefly in mind was reconciliation with mainland China. He proposed the establishment in the Pacific and Asia of an international community of law and order, naturally under the leadership of the U.S. Government. "Mainland China" was invited to join it.

It would of course be an exaggeration to affirm that the United States and China have concluded a "compact" on the basis of some definite platform. The appeal for "reconciliation" with People's China, which is practically the main element of the Pacific Doctrine, is merely one American diplomatic step towards the reappraisal of Washington's irreconcilable policy towards the People's Republic of China. It must be said that there are still quite a few people in the U.S. upper spheres who oppose such reappraisal. But the fact that the U.S. Government and Congress have been discussing this question for several years is in itself significant. The Mao Tse-tung group's break with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism has enhanced the U.S. leaders' confidence that it is possible to carry out a whole number of political

¹ *New York Times*, December 16, 1963.

¹ "Four Essentials for Peace in Asia. Address by President Johnson", *The Department of State Bulletin*, August 1, 1966.

² "Four Essentials for Peace in Asia...", p. 161.

manoeuvres to foster Washington's interests. And so they continue with their unusual courtship of the Maoists.

This is not the first time that the U.S. imperialists have courted the Chinese Communist Party. In 1944-46 Generals Patrick J. Hurley and George C. Marshall had lengthy talks with its leaders and at the same time acted as "mediators" in the negotiations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. A thorough study of the activities of Mao Tse-tung and his followers led the U.S. Government to arrive at the conclusion then that these people who called themselves Communists were in reality nationalists and "agrarian reformists".¹

Characteristically enough, it is this very same factor that underlies Washington's present plans for a rapprochement with the Maoists. Its hopes received further encouragement from the Maoists' brazen anti-Soviet stand on the support given Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968, by the armed forces of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the German Democratic Republic. In those days the Mao group actually sided with the worst enemies of the socialist community. The Maoists motivated their stand by their alleged concern for the interests of the world revolutionary movement, notably the national liberation struggle. The Afro-Asian and Latin American national liberation forces, on the other hand, appreciated the action taken by the five Warsaw Treaty countries. They justly pointed out that these countries had not only safeguarded the gains of socialism in Czechoslovakia but dealt a telling blow to imperialism's global plans and thus rendered an invaluable service to the national liberation movement in all its forms and manifestations.

It is noteworthy that shortly after August 21 the

representatives in Cairo of the African National Congress (ANC), the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), the Angola Popular Liberation Movement (MPLA), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the African Party of Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) visited the Soviet mission in the Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation and expressed support with the steps taken to assist Czechoslovakia and safeguard her socialist gains. The efforts undertaken by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, the G.D.R. and Poland, they said, were based on the principles of solidarity and encouraged the national liberation movements in Africa in their struggle against colonialism and racism.

The All-African Federation of Trade Unions also expressed solidarity with the Warsaw Treaty states. In the atmosphere of ideological confusion created by the imperialists, it said, African workers would not allow themselves to be deluded by the efforts to equate aggression against the peoples of Latin America, the Middle East and Asia to the situation in Czechoslovakia.¹

Many progressive African organisations deemed it their duty to repudiate the fables about the annexation of Czechoslovakia by the five socialist states. Czechoslovakia was a party to the Warsaw Treaty, the Nigerian Trades Union Congress said in its statement, and to allow international imperialism to deprive the Czechoslovak people of their gains would be to display indifference bordering on suicide. Another Nigerian organisation, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, urged the national liberation forces to be alert to the imperialists' splitting activities and to draw an appropriate lesson from the Czechoslovak developments. Nigeria, its

¹ *United States Relations with China*, pp. 64-72.

¹ *Pravda*, August 28, 1968.

statement said, was familiar with the tactics of the imperialist forces—division, alienation and dismemberment—and, consequently, fully understood the problems confronting the people of Czechoslovakia.

Similar solidarity with the action taken by the five socialist countries was expressed by many progressive, anti-imperialist organisations in Latin American countries. The Federation of Ecuadorian Coastal Farm Workers said in a statement that its members backed the assistance given by the Soviet Union, the G.D.R., Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland to the people of Czechoslovakia in their just struggle against the counter-revolution and in defence of their socialist gains.

It must be said that the absolute majority of the Latin American Communist Parties voiced solidarity with the action taken by the Warsaw Treaty states. The Chilean Communist Party organised mass meetings in support of this action. "The armed forces of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were introduced into Czechoslovakia with the sole aim of defending socialism," said Luis Corvalán, General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee.¹

The imperialist provocations were condemned by Eduardo Machado, veteran Venezuelan Communist. The Communist Party of El Salvador stressed the historic importance of the action taken by the five socialist countries, while the Colombian Communist Party insisted that in its actions the Soviet Union was always guided by the interests of the struggle against the imperialist system of enslavement. And the People's Party of Panama urged the workers to be vigilant in view of the aggravation of the ideological struggle in the world following the action taken by the five socialist countries.

As for the Mao group, its attitude was best ex-

pressed by Chou En-lai in his speech of August 23, 1968. The Chinese Premier's speech was of a provocative nature typical of the Maoists and grossly attacked Soviet foreign policy. Chou En-lai accused the Soviet Union of introducing troops into Czechoslovakia with "the tacit consent of American imperialism". He followed this up with a provocative advice to the Czechoslovak people to wage a "revolutionary struggle" against the armed forces of the five allied states. Chou En-lai thus openly advocated civil wars in the socialist countries and armed conflicts among them.¹

The Chinese Premier's speech was further proof of the betrayal of the anti-imperialist forces by the Maoists. The Plenary Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee in October 1968 was used for escalating attacks against those who were striving to establish a united anti-imperialist front of all the revolutionary and progressive forces in the world. This Plenary Meeting directed the Chinese and foreign Maoists to speed up the establishment of a broad united front under the leadership of the "great helmsman". The Mao group is not losing hope to unite various anti-Soviet organisations in a "world revolutionary peoples'" front.

To stimulate the forces willing to join such a front, poison their minds still more with anti-Sovietism and at the same time prevent the weakening of the anti-Soviet sentiment in China, the Mao group engaged in organising armed provocations on the Soviet border. On their orders, Chinese units attacked Soviet border guards on the island of Damansky in the River Ussuri on March 2 and 15, 1969.

In a talk with a delegation of Japanese Socialists on July 10, 1964, Mao Tse-tung laid claim to Soviet territory east of Lake Baikal. The Soviet-

¹ *Pravda*, August 25, 1968.

¹ See *Izvestia*, August 29, 1968.

Chinese consultations concerning adjustments in some sectors of the border, held that same year on the initiative of the U.S.S.R., were broken off by the Chinese Government. The Maoists deliberately created another "territorial problem" and decided to "settle" it by means of armed provocations. The Damansky events make it all the clearer why the Peking policy-makers and propagandists gave such a hostile reception to the message sent by the Soviet Government to all heads of state and government on the eve of 1964, proposing an agreement renouncing force as a means of settling territorial disputes. In the last ten years Peking diplomats have fully proved by their actions that their methods of settling territorial or border issues merely alienate peoples.

The Soviet Government Statement of March 29, 1969, said the armed provocations of the Chinese authorities on the Ussuri were no chance incidents. They "do serious damage to the cause of socialism and peace, to the common front of anti-imperialist struggle, to the friendship of the Soviet and Chinese peoples".¹ The Soviet Government proposed that Soviet and Chinese official representatives resume in the near future the consultations which were broken off in 1964. The Statement expressed the Soviet Government's firm conviction that the basic interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples would ultimately make it possible to eliminate and overcome the difficulties in Soviet-Chinese relations.

At the same time the Soviet Government stated that it resolutely rejected all encroachments on Soviet territory and that attempts to talk to the Soviet Union in the language of guns would meet with a firm rebuff.

The armed provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border pleased the imperialists vastly. The *New York Times* wrote on March 19, 1969, that the

¹ *Pravda*, March 30, 1969.

further deterioration of the relations between China and the Soviet Union was welcomed by imperialist circles. The Saigon puppets voiced confidence that the Vietnamese problem would be settled in the near future—in the way suiting the reactionary forces of South Vietnam and the United States.

The ones who were especially happy were the West German revenge-seekers. They took advantage of the Maoists' gambles to reiterate their intentions to revise the results of the Second World War and recarve the map of Europe. The neo-nazis of the National Democratic Party openly affirmed that Peking's actions were a real godsend for the implementation of a "truly German [sic] policy".

Peking was applauded just as enthusiastically by the South Korean reactionaries who decided that the situation was favourable for a "crusade against the North", that is, against the Korean People's Democratic Republic. The reactionary leaders of Biafra, which is far from the Ussuri and which is seeking to secede from Nigeria, also expressed sympathies with the organisers of armed provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border, for the Mao group has long been backing the Nigerian separatists. The rebellious separatists operating in the south of the Sudan and receiving arms from the Maoists were happy too: their Peking patrons had set another example of splitting activity. Such examples inspire all separatists and splitters wherever they may be.

It should be stressed that the news of the Maoists' armed provocations on the Soviet border was appreciated by the opponents of a just settlement in the Middle East. Mao's agents in this area oppose all U.N. efforts to promote such a settlement and thus hamper the elimination of the consequences of Israel's aggression. At the very height of this aggression in June 1967, Chou En-lai appealed to the Arab states "in no case to cease firing". When the firing ceased at the demand of the United

Nations, the Maoists decided to do everything to prevent a just settlement and normalisation in the Middle East.

Since then the Chinese press and radio have not stopped for a day their slanderous campaign to persuade the gullible that Israel's aggression against Arab countries was the result of a "Soviet-American compact". The progressive forces in the Arab world immediately exposed the aim of this campaign as an attempt to undermine Arab-Soviet friendship and drive another wedge in the world anti-imperialist front.

The Lebanese newspaper *An-Nidal* wrote in those days: "By its provocative actions Peking is seeking to alienate the Arabs from their great and sincere friend at a time when they are waging a life-and-death struggle against imperialism and Zionism. Peking is trying to deal a blow to three revolutionary forces: the socialist camp, the national liberation movement and the international working class."

Such a conclusion suggests itself when one analyses every single step of Maoist diplomacy, which has dedicated itself entirely to splitting activities.

* * *

The interests of the world revolutionary forces above all require unity of action in the struggle against the common enemy.

The revolutionary struggle has proved convincingly that the international anti-imperialist front is sufficiently effective only when the Communists act together. Such joint action is especially important today. It is indispensable to paralyse by all possible means the political strategy of imperialism which banks mainly on the division of the communist movement.

The champions of this strategy have never been

so active as they are now. And this is not fortuitous. The Maoists' splitting activities have become extremely dangerous. Being in power in one of the biggest countries of the world, Mao Tse-tung and his group are using their enormous government, propaganda and diplomatic machine, as well as colossal sums of money, to foster their interests. Peking pours torrents of slander on any Communist Party that displays an initiative in strengthening the revolutionary camp. They thereby objectively help the imperialists implement their strategy of splitting the Communist Parties.

The Maoists did their best to prevent the convocation of a new international conference of Communist and Workers' Parties and rudely replied to the invitation sent them by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party to take part in the Consultative Meeting which was held in Budapest from February 26 to March 5, 1968. The Chinese splitters violently attacked the Preparatory Committee of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties.

Overcoming considerable difficulties, many of them due to the splitting activities of the present leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, 75 Communist Parties met in Moscow in June 1969. The main task of this international conference was determined with due consideration of the indisputable fact that, while Communist Parties might differ seriously on certain issues, they all agreed that they had a common enemy—imperialism. Hence the agenda: "Tasks at the Present Stage of the Struggle Against Imperialism and United Action of the Communist and Workers' Parties and All Anti-Imperialist Forces."

The Meeting appealed to all the Communists of the world, to all opponents of imperialism, to all those who are ready to fight for peace, freedom and progress, to join forces. The Main Document adopt-

ed by the Meeting defined the main objective—to give all-round support to the heroic Vietnamese people. It further stressed that the main link of united action of the anti-imperialist forces remained the struggle against the menace of a thermonuclear war, for world peace. The Meeting condemned all imperialist acts of aggression and all forms of oppression and enslavement of peoples. "The demand of our epoch," the Main Document said, "is to rid our planet completely of the curse of colonialism, destroy its last centres and prevent its revival in new, camouflaged forms."¹

Unity is strength. Such is the motto of all the revolutionaries, of all progressive, anti-imperialist organisations, parties and states. The struggle against the splitters and the adventurers of all kinds will be long and difficult before this great motto is realised. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union strives for such an outcome of the unprecedentedly bitter struggle that has been forced upon the world communist movement by the Chinese splitters.

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¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, Peace and Socialism Publishers, Prague, 1969, p. 34.

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